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ABSTRACT 
9/11 highlighted failures by both the intelligence and policymaking communities, and 
these failures were identified by the 9/11 Commission.  These failures only related to the 
inability of the intelligence community to imagine how terrorists might use aircraft as a 
suicide vehicle, and how politicians failed to eliminate the al-Qaeda threat and Osama bin 
Laden.  Completely unnoticed by the 9/11 Commission, but acknowledged by many 
within the academic community, was a failure of academia to understand the threat by al-
Qaeda and focus too much on weapons of mass destruction terrorism.  This thesis 
examines the question:  To what extent were the academic, policymaking, and 
intelligence communities obsessed with chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 
(CBRN) terrorism prior to 9/11?  The thesis concludes that CBRN terrorism was a 
concern, but was not the greatest national security threat prior to 9/11. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The 9/11 Commissioners identified four failures contributing to the success of the 
attacks:  imagination, policy, capabilities, and management.1  The imagination failure 
was considered to be the most critical, and the commission argued that organizations such 
as the Counterterrorism Center (CTC) at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) failed to 
imagine and plan for the possibility that terrorists might use aircraft as weapons.  This 
imagination failure has been widely accepted as a fundamental cause for the disaster of 
9/11, but little work has been done to examine why organizations such as the CTC failed 
to imagine the threat.  We appear to understand the “what” of the 9/11 failure, but not the 
“why.”  This thesis will ask why the academic, policymaking communities failed to 
anticipate the use of suicide hijackings.   It argues that these communities might have 
been too focused on other methods of attack, or other national security threats.  Following 
the Cold War, these national security threats changed with proliferation and terrorism 
overtaking conventional threats, and the result, according to some experts, was an 
obsession with WMD terrorism. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union led to a rising concern over the proliferation of 
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons.  This, coupled with the 
1995 attack by Aum Shinrikyo on a Tokyo subway using Sarin gas, as well as the 
massive stockpiles of Iraqi chemical and biological weapons discovered after the first 
Gulf War, led many to become concerned that terrorists could easily acquire and use 
CBRN weapons.2  As CBRN terrorism became a plausible threat, many leaders used 
heated rhetoric on the topic, causing some to argue these leaders were obsessed. 
Although the 9/11 Commission did not see an obsession with CBRN terrorism as 
a factor, some experts have suggested it may have contributed to the failure to prevent the 
                                                 
1 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: 
Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 1st ed. (New York: 
Norton, 2004), 4. 
2 Ehud Sprinzak, "The Great Superterrorism Scare," Foreign Policy 112 (1998): 110–111. 
 2 
9/11 attacks.  After 9/11, terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman testified before Congress that 
everyone was fixated on weapons of mass destruction (WMD), stating, “The implicit 
assumptions of much of American planning scenarios on mass casualty attacks were that 
they would involve germ or chemical agents.”3  Andrew Silke furthers this notion of 
WMD preoccupation by the academic community claiming, “If the failure to mark out 
the importance of al-Qa’eda was the biggest oversight in research prior to 9/11, the 
obsession with work on WMD threats—as opposed to more mundane tactics—will likely 
be judged as the second most significant failing.” 4   
This thesis will examine the question:  To what extent were the academic, 
policymaking, and intelligence communities obsessed with CBRN terrorism prior to 
9/11?  This thesis examines each of these communities to determine whether its members 
were obsessed with CBRN terrorism and what, if any, the implications were 
B. HYPOTHESIS AND FINDINGS 
Research on this thesis started with the hypothesis that an obsession with CBRN 
terrorism by the academic, policymaking, and intelligence communities was a 
contributing factor in the overall intelligence failure of 9/11.  But, over the course of the 
research, this thesis found quite the opposite.  On a rhetorical level, the concern over 
CBRN terrorism might have approached obsession.  After examining the factual data of 
topics researched by the academic community, policies enacted for the sake of national 
security, and collection priorities of the intelligence community, we find that an 
obsession did not exist.   
                                                 
3 Bruce Hoffman, Lessons of 9/11, United States Joint September 11, 2001 Inquiry, Staff of the House 
and Senate Select Committees on Intelligence (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2002), 18.  
4 Andrew Silke, "An Introduction to Terrorist Research," in Research on Terrorism Trends, 
Achievements and Failures, ed. Andrew Silke (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2004), 24. 
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1. Academic Community 
Given the hindsight statements by experts within the field of terrorism identifying 
an obsession by academia with WMD, is there empirical evidence that the academic 
community was infatuated with the prospect of CBRN terrorism?  If so, what drove this 
obsession?  
2. Policy Makers 
Following the Cold War, national security needs were constantly evolving.  Did 
politicians correctly perceive those needs and adjust priorities accordingly?  What were 
the most significant threats facing the U.S. prior to 9/11?  Where does CBRN terrorism 
fall within this spectrum?  Were politicians focusing academic and intelligence resources 
on the prospect of CBRN terrorism? 
3. Intelligence Community 
Intelligence agencies provide information to policy makers enabling them to make 
informed decisions.  This relationship is a two-way street where politicians are able to 
influence the direction of collection and assessment of these agencies.  In the post-Cold 
War environment, where were intelligence agencies focusing their efforts?  Were they 
investigating CBRN terrorism to an obsessive degree? 
C. IMPORTANCE 
These questions are important for two main reasons.  First, having recently passed 
the ten-year anniversary of 9/11, many of the failures identified by the 9/11 Commission 
have gone unanswered.  Other failures have not been identified.  Conventional analysis 
conducted by both the Congressional investigation and the 9/11 Commission failed to 
recognize what may have been a critical failure, the obsession with WMD terrorism by 
the academic, policymaking, and intelligence communities.  Second, we are more 
obsessed with WMD terrorism today, suggesting that we are still blinded and vulnerable 
to the more likely, and more commonplace, threats we might actually face.   
 4 
Concerns over the policies and agencies responsible for the prevention of terrorist 
attacks have been in the spotlight for the last ten years.  Members of the 9/11 
Commission are engaged in a process of reviewing the implementation of 
recommendations they made in the wake of their report.  Progress has been made in some 
areas, but others are far from complying with the commission’s recommendations.  In 
their recent statement before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, the chairmen of the 9/11 Commission, Governor Kean and 
Senator Hamilton, stated that these unfulfilled recommendations, “…require urgent 
attention because the threat from al Qaeda, related terrorist groups, and individual 
adherents to violent Islamist extremism persists.”5   
We have not yet understood or fully identified the imagination failure of 9/11, 
which related to the inability to perceive the use of a hijacked airliner as a suicide 
weapon.  It did not address the national security priorities researched by the academic 
community, policies created by policymakers, or collection allocation of the intelligence 
community.   The problem of imagination still persists, as evidenced by the attempted 
attacks since 9/11.  We have not anticipated several new methods of attacks:  shoe 
bombs, underwear bombs, and exploding printer cartridges.  Are we failing in 
imagination because resources and attention are directed elsewhere? 
Counterterrorism does not have the luxury of an infinite resource pool.  The U.S. 
has spent $1 trillion on counterterrorism in the aftermath of 9/11.6  It is therefore vital 
that our policy, resources, and efforts focus on the most important and likely threats 
facing our country.  The debate over the probability of CBRN terrorism needs to be 
addressed with a risk-management based approach so these resources can be directed 
appropriately.  More importantly, an intense focus on one area of terrorism must not blind 
us to other more likely methods of high-consequence attack.  
                                                 
5 Thomas H. Kean and Lee Hamilton, "Testimony " in Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs (2011), 4. 
6 John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, "Terror, Security, and Money:  Balancing the Risks, Benefits, 
and Costs of Homeland Security," in Annual Convention of the Midwest Political Science Association 
(Chicago, IL: 2011), 2. 
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D. ORIGIN OF THE OBSESSION DEBATE 
The debate over the possibility of CBRN terrorism has existed since the advent of 
nuclear weapons.  In 1946, Oppenheimer was concerned over a few men smuggling an 
atomic bomb into New York City.7  Early fears were mainly over nuclear terrorism, 
which coincided with Cold War fears of nuclear war.  The scope of this thesis will be 
limited to the modern fear over CBRN terrorism that began with a combination of events:  
the fall of the Soviet Union and the associated concern for the security of their CBRN 
weapons; the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway system; and the 
discovery of a large Iraqi stockpile of chemical and biological weapons following 
Operation Desert Storm.8 
Senator Richard Lugar stated that, “As a consequence of the collapse of the Soviet 
totalitarian command and control society, a vast supermarket of weapons and materials of 
mass destruction has become accessible.”9  His comments were based upon the premise 
that the collapsing government was unable to pay soldiers who guarded NBC stockpiles 
and the scientists who created them.  When guards go unpaid, and are unable to sustain 
themselves and their families, they might become desperate and potentially sell the 
equipment they safeguard.  Others made a similar argument concerning the scientists who 
create these weapons.  Many feared they would immigrate to North Korea or Iran, given 
the right price.10  These viewpoints led many to obsess that a plethora of CBRN weapons 
would become easily available to any terrorist organization.   
Iraq’s large quantities of chemical and biological weapons, combined with Iraqi 
humiliation over losing the first Gulf War, provided Saddam Hussein his only option to 
deal with the U.S, asymmetric warfare with terrorists.  Iraq also possessed a large arsenal 
of chemical and biological weapons.  According to a declassified intelligence report, Iraqi 
                                                 
7 John Mueller, Overblown:  How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security 
Threats, and Why We Believe Them (New York: Free Press, 2006), 16. 
8 Ehud Sprinzak, "The Great Superterrorism Scare," Foreign Policy 112 (1998):  110–111. 
9 Richard G. Lugar, "Viewpoint:  The Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction:  A U.S. Response," 
The Nonproliferation Review 6, no. 3 (1999): 51. 
10 John Parachini, "Collapsing States and Abrupt Regime Changes:  Implications for NBC Terrorism," 
in Hype or Reality:  The "New Terrorism" and Mass Casualty Attacks, ed. Brad Roberts (Alexandria, VA: 
The Chemical and Biological Arms Institute, 2000), 85–86. 
 6 
agents were trained to use chemical and biological weapons by the East German State 
Security Service.  Agents “learned how to handle anthrax, elements that cause yellow 
fever, and nerve gases such as Yperite and Sarin.” 11  It is possible that the Iraqi 
intelligence service provided this training to terrorist organizations.  With the 
combination of capability, training, and intent obsession with CBRN terrorism was 
further fueled. 
Aum Shinrikyo’s attack on the Japanese subway system in 1995 was a catalyst for 
furthering the obsession with NBC terrorism.  Prior to this attack, no terrorist group had 
used chemical or biological weapons on a large scale, and the small number of incidents 
that did occur were unsuccessful.  Aum’s attack was an international media event leaving 
12 dead and 5,500 affected by the sarin gas.  Casualties on this scale invalidated a 
previous widely held view often quoted that “terrorists want a lot of people watching, not 
a lot of people dead.”12  Of the three events spawning the obsession, this is perhaps the 
critical one.  In his research, Cameron states, “Most analysts and those charged with 
countering terrorism assumed that Aum’s attack represented a harbinger of the future and 
that other, increasingly lethal, attacks with WMD would follow and that terrorism was on 
an escalatory spiral.”13 
E. OBSESSION, PESSIMISTS, AND OPTIMISTS 
As this thesis begins a search for obsession, the term must be defined.  Webster’s 
Medical Dictionary defines obsession as “a persistent disturbing preoccupation with an 
often unreasonable idea or feeling.” In order to reach a judgment that any of the three 
communities were obsessed with CBRN terrorism, two questions must be answered.  
Was the preoccupation with CBRN terrorism persistent?  Was the preoccupation 
unreasonable?  Those who are obsessed with CBRN terrorists have been labeled as 
                                                 
11 GulfLink, Iraqis Trained to Use Chemical and Biological Weapons (1995). 
12 Brian Jenkins, Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1975), 4. 
13 Gavin Cameron, "Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism Reserach:  Past and Future," in Research 
on Terrorism.  Trends, Achievements, and Failures, ed. Andrew Silke (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2004), 
80. 
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pessimists or doomsayers, and the logic behind this way of thinking will be further 
examined in this section to fully understand what this thesis searches for. 
Relative to the likelihood of CBRN terrorism, people generally fall into two 
camps:  pessimists and optimists.  Pessimists believe that the era of superterrorism has 
emerged, and that attacks will produce more casualties with more sinister weapons.  
Optimists believe that terrorists will stick to the traditional gun and bomb, and that they 
do not want a lot of people dead, they want attention.  These camps have members in 
academic, policymaking, and intelligence communities, but the main ideas are best 
summarized by academics, and will be discussed in further detail below.  Before the two 
schools of thought are further analyzed, one must understand how they reach the decision 
to support one cause or the other.  In order to understand how each camp arrives on their 
viewpoint, one must examine how they view the WMD acquisition process and how they 
view the motives that might inspire a group to use such a weapon. 
1. Capabilities Proposition 
According to Sprinzak, the capabilities proposition envisions that “…anyone with 
access to modern biochemical technology and a college science education could produce 
enough chemical or biological agents in his or her basement to devastate the population 
of London, Tokyo, or Washington.”14  Believers in the capabilities proposition find that 
materials are readily available from a number of sources and that with the right 
education; one can develop at least chemical or biological weapons.  Sprinzak's point of 
view here clearly takes on pessimistic tones, even though he is clearly an optimist.  The 
important concept is the likelihood of terrorists using CBRN weapons is dependent on 
how or if the group can acquire them.  Sprinzak limits his capabilities proposition to the 
terrorist constructing his own CBRN weapon, but he fails to examine other methods of 
acquiring CBRN weapons.  The capabilities proposition should have three subcategories:  
construction, state sponsorship, and black markets. 
                                                 
14 Cameron,  112. 
 8 
a. Construction  
For construction terrorists have two options.  The first is to build it, as 
Sprinzak defines in his original definition of the capabilities proposition.  The second 
option is to hire, kidnap, or brainwash scientists to do the work for them.  Sprinzak does 
not account for this second option.  Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, many 
believed that a large number of scientists, with knowledge of CBRN weapons would be 
unemployed and readily available.  This “brain drain” on the scientific community deeply 
troubled all of the communities analyzed in this thesis.  In 1992, former CIA Director 
Robert Gates estimated the number of scientists from the former Soviet Union who could 
build nuclear weapons between 1,000 and 2,000, and chemical or biological weapons at a 
few thousand.15  The concern was that those scientists whose talents had no use outside of 
the weapons industry would become recruits of governments or terrorist organizations 
desiring CBRN capabilities.  
b. State Sponsors 
Another avenue of acquisition is from a sponsor.  From 1993 to 1999, the 
following countries were on the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism:  
“Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria.”16  Of these seven countries, 
Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Syria all were suspected of either possessing or 
attempting to acquire biological and chemical weapons.17  With both the capability and a 
grievance against the U.S., why then were these nations not handing these weapons out to 
the terrorist groups they sponsored?  On the issue of state sponsored proliferation to 
terrorist groups, Laqueur has stated, “There is no reason to assume that a rationally acting 
government, however radical would pass on nuclear weapons to a terrorist group, because 
                                                 
15 Robert Gates, "Weapons Proliferation in the New World Order:  Testimony before the Committee 
on Governmental Affairs," in Committe on Governmental Affairs, 102nd Congress (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1992), 9. 
16 U.S Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999 (2000), 2. 
17  Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer, America's Achilles' Heel:  
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1998),, 
64. 
 9 
the consequences could be devastating for the suppliers.”18  This could also be applied to 
chemical and biological weapons.  Laqueur uses an important modifier in his quote, 
“rationally acting government."  This term cannot be applied to all state sponsors of 
terrorism equally.   
A great number of unstable and failing states exist who possess CBRN 
weapons.  If a regime were forced to the breaking point with no hope of coming out of a 
situation alive, they might give CBRN weapons to a terrorist group.  The Bush 
administration used this as logic for going to war in 2003.  Iraq had a large arsenal of 
NBC weapons and had used them in their war against Iran, thus showing they did not 
possess a norm against the use of such weapons.  When they lost the war against the 
coalition in the first Gulf War, it was widely believed they would use terrorists as proxies 
to fight the west.  Given that no such attack occurred with a weapon donated by a state 
sponsor, this provides some evidence to support the notion that a state actor will not 
provide CBRN weapons to a terrorist organization because of fear of retaliation.  While 
state sponsors would likely find these reasons as a deterrent to avoid proliferation of 
WMD to terrorists, another compelling reason is control.   
If CBRN weapons were given to a terrorist organization, the sponsor 
would lose control over the asset, with no guarantee for how it would be used.  There is 
no assurance that the organization would use the weapon against a promised target, or 
that the group would not turn the weapons against their sponsors.  Laqueur stated, 
“Governments, however ruthless, ambitious, and ideologically extreme will be reluctant 
to pass on unconventional weapons to terrorist groups over which they cannot have full 
control….”19 For example, when North Korea attempted to acquire nuclear weapons from 
China, they were refused.20  State sponsors of terrorism are highly unlikely to pass CBRN 
weapons to terrorist organizations, an assessment that has been supported by the 
intelligence community. 
                                                 
18 Walter Laqueur, The New Terrorism:  Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), 256. 
19 Walter Laqueur, "Postmodern Terrorism," Foreign Affairs 75, no. 5 (1996): 34. 
20 Mueller, Overblown, 16. 
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c. Black Market 
The fall of the Soviet Union provided a lax security environment where 
many thought CBRN stockpiles would be readily available on the black market.  Jessica 
Stern has called this “the most profound contribution to the increased danger that 
terrorists will acquire and use weapons of mass destruction…”21 Combined with an 
inadequate security environment, corrupt government, and organized crime, the threats 
posed by black markets appeared to be high. 
2. Chaos Proposition 
It is not enough for a terrorist group to possess CBRN weapons; they must have 
the will to use them.  Central to the belief of the pessimist is the fear that a number of 
groups are willing to employ WMD.  This fear is based upon the chaos proposition 
outlined by Sprinzak that states, “The post-Cold War world swarms with shadowy 
extremist groups, religious fanatics, and assorted crazies eager to launch a major attack 
on the civilized world—preferably on U.S. territory.”22  This ideological basis only 
applies to a limited number of terrorist groups, but there are reasons why all groups might 
not use CBRN weapons. 
The same logic as to why state actors do not use CBRN weapons has commonly 
been applied to non-state actors.  NBC weapons have rarely been used by state-actors for 
several reasons:  widely held norms against the use of such weapons, fears of reciprocity, 
and fear of international and domestic backlash.23  These same norms against the use of 
CBRN weapons can be generally applied to traditional terrorist groups, but not to 
religious cults or millenarian groups.  Thus it is important to examine a group's 
ideological background, in order to determine if they might use CBRN weapons.   
                                                 
21 Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 88. 
22 Sprinzak, 112. 
23  Ehud Sprinzak, "On Not Overstating the Problem," in Hype or Reality:  The "New Terrorism" and 
Casualty Attacks, ed. Brad Roberts (Alexandria, VA: The Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 
2000), 28. 
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Traditional terrorist groups have been characterized as either ethnic or socio-
revolutionary.24  Both of these groups would not likely use CBRN weapon for several 
reasons.  First, any group that acquires or uses these weapons will face a harsh response 
from the government they oppose.  More importantly, they face alienating their support 
base through the use of weapons generally believed as immoral.  Additionally, young 
organizations or individuals do not carry out extreme violence.  It takes time to harden a 
person to use a WMD with a string of low-level violence prior to escalation, and the 
enemy must be dehumanized. 25  It may be easier to dehumanize the enemy in the case of 
ethnic terrorism, and this has widely been proven, for example the Palestinians calling 
Jews dogs.26  Groups falling in the socio-revolutionary typology will have a more 
difficult time using such a weapon on their own people, unless they specifically target 
government forces and ensure there are no civilian casualties.  It is inherently difficult to 
control the effects of CBRN weapons, and it would be nearly impossible to avoid civilian 
casualties. 
Only a small number of terrorist groups exist with the necessary ideological 
attributes to conduct an attack using CBRN weapons: religious millenarian cults, 
brutalized groups [those who have been subjected to genocide or destruction], and “small 
terrorist cells or socially deranged groups”.27  Aum fits the millenarian cult typology, and 
their sarin gas attack provides evidence that such a group is willing to use CBRN 
weapons. They believed Armageddon was a foregone conclusion and were willing to 
give it a push.  There is also some evidence to support the idea that those groups facing 
genocide are willing to use these weapons.  Uranium was found in the apartment of an 
ex-Bosnian government member in 1994.  At the time, Bosnians were experiencing 
“something bordering on genocide and nobody was giving them the help they needed.”28  
                                                 
24 Peter Waldmann, "Ethnic and Sociorevolutionary Terrorism:  A Comparison of Structures," 
International Social Movement Research 4, no. (1992): 237–238. 
25 Sprinzak, "On Not Overstating the Problem," 47. 
26 Death in Gaza, directed by James Miller, HBO films 2004. 
27 Sprinzak, "The Great Superterrorism Scare," 114. 
28 Alex P. Schmid, "Terrorism and the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction:  From Where the Risk?," 
Terrorism and Political Violence 11, no. 4 (1999): 115. 
 12 
Any group with facing annihilation, with nothing to lose, might be willing to use CBRN 
weapons. 
3. Camp 1: Doomsayers 
The pessimists argue that terrorists will obtain and use CBRN weapons 
representing “an eminent threat to America’s future.”29  They find that the consequences 
of a WMD attack outweigh any analytical threat analysis or mathematical risked-based 
probability analysis, and are willing to spend whatever amount of money is necessary for 
defense.  Doomsayers would accuse the optimists of complacency who use bad 
assumptions governing the possible terrorist acquisition and use of CBRN weapons.30  
This school is firmly grounded in the chaos proposition.  Matthew Morgan claimed that 
terrorists have focused on chaos and destruction over political or religious views and 
“today’s terrorists seek destruction and chaos as an ends in themselves.”31  His main 
source of evidence was Pakistani General S.K. Malik’s 1979 book, which stated, “terror 
struck into the hearts of the enemies is not only a means, it is in the end itself.” 32  
Furthering this idea were opinions such as that of Harvard University Professor of 
Human Rights Michael Ignatieff, who stated shortly after 9/11, “What we are up against 
is apocalyptic nihilism.  The nihilism of their means—the indifference to human costs—
takes their actions not only out of the realm of politics, but even out of the realm of war 
itself.”33   
4. Camp 2:  Naysayers 
At the other end of the spectrum are the optimists, who believe terrorists are 
unlikely to acquire and use CBRN weapons.  This camp centers their argument around 
                                                 
29 Ashton Carter, John Deutch, and Philip Zelikow, "Catastrophic Terrorism:  Tackling the New 
Danger," Foreign Affairs 77, no. 6 (1998): 94. 
30 Falkenrath, et. al., 27. 
31 Matthew J. Morgan, "The Origins of the New Terrorism," Parameters 24 (Spring 2004): 30. 
32 S.K. Malik, The Quranic Concept of War (Lahore, Pakistan: Wajidalis, 1979), xv.  In his 2007 Book 
Review of The Quranic Concept of War, Army Lt. Col. Joseph Myers states Malik’s concept of terror as 
the end, versus the means, as his most noteworthy and controversial statement in the book.  Joseph C. 
Myers, "Book Review:  The Quranic Concept of War," Parameters 36 (Winter 2006/2007): 7. 
33 Michael Ignatieff, "It's War - but It Doesn't Have to Be Dirty," The Guardian, October 1, 2001. 
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the following themes:  no one has successfully perpetrated an attack using these methods 
with large scale casualties and terrorists pursuing political goals are more interested in the 
media spotlight than large body counts.34  Sprinzak summarized the naysayers viewpoint 
stating: “the threat of superterrorism—the strategic use of unconventional weapons by 
non-state terrorist organizations to bring about a disaster involving thousands  
 
of casualties—is much smaller than believed.”35  Optimists also believe “the relatively 
low risks of such an event do not justify the high costs now being contemplated to defend 
against it.”36   
E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The 9/11 Commission Report is the quintessential historical record regarding the 
events leading up to and occurring on that day.  Of the four failures identified by the 9/11 
Commission, this thesis will address only imagination.  Analysis of the imagination 
failure is limited to intelligence failure and the potential use of aircraft as suicide 
vehicles.  Despite the identification of an intelligence and policy failure, no study was 
conducted regarding what these communities were focused on, and the commission 
makes no mention at all of academic failure. 
Most accounts of 9/11 do not mention any focus on WMD terrorism.  In their 
analysis of the imagination failure, commissioners very briefly mention the WMD threat 
prior to 9/11.  They insinuate that the head analyst at the CTC was focused on 
catastrophic threats only in terms of CBRN weapons.  Here, they present a single piece of 
evidence, a quote from a book by former CTC head analyst, Paul Pillar, “It would be a 
mistake to redefine counterterrorism as a task of dealing with ‘catastrophic,’ ‘grand,’ or 
‘super’ terrorism, when in fact these labels do not represent most of the terrorism that the 
United States is likely to face or most of the costs that terrorism imposes on U.S. 
                                                 
34 Walter Laqueur, The New Terrorism:  Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), 73. 
35 Sprinzak, "On Not Overstating the Problem," 3. 
36 Sprinzak, "The Great Superterrorism Scare," 111. 
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interests.”37  From this quote, the commission arrives at an assessment that the “head of 
analysis at the CTC until 1999 discounted the alarms about a catastrophic threat as 
relating only to the danger of chemical, biological, or nuclear attack….”38 The 
commission does not convey what it meant by this statement.  Was Pillar, and by 
extension the CTC, obsessed with WMD?   
In the book cited by the 9/11 Commission, Pillar suggests he was not.  Pillar 
states, “CBRN terrorism should not be the main basis for shaping thinking about 
terrorism overall or for organizing efforts to confront it.”39  From his own words Pillar is 
advocating that we should not allow ourselves to become obsessed with the WMD threat.  
It appears as though the 9/11 Commission misinterpreted Pillar, but this raises an 
interesting question of whether intelligence agencies were preoccupied with CBRN 
terrorism as the 9/11 Commission vaguely suggests, or if it was one of the many worries 
that Pillar and the rest of the intelligence community were focused on. 
1. Academic Community 
With the advantage of hindsight, many academics have acknowledged the failure 
within their own community and the political arena.  Bruce Hoffman identified a gap in 
his foreword to Research on Terrorism, “Much attention has been focused on the 
intelligence failures that led to the tragic events of 11th September 2001.  Surprisingly 
little attention, however, has been devoted to the academic failures.”40  While 
acknowledged by many within the academic community, little evidence has been 
presented to advocate this position.  Andrew Silke makes the strongest argument in 
support of this position: “If the failure to mark out the importance of al-Qa’eda was the 
biggest oversight in research prior to 9/11, the obsession with work on WMD threats—as 
opposed to more mundane tactics—will likely be judged as the second most significant 
                                                 
37 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 343. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Paul R. Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 
2001), 23. 
40 Bruce Hoffman, "Preface," in Research on Terrorism Trends, Achievements and Failures, ed. 
Andrew Silke (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2004), xvii. 
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failing.”41 In his research, Silke analyzes the academic focus prior to 9/11.  He provides 
statistical analysis of the terrorism academic community including authors (profiling 
number of articles and books published and their backgrounds), country focus, regional 
focus, terrorist group focus, and group ideology.42  As this thesis will demonstrate 
however, Silke's research is limited to only the two major terrorism journals, and his 
statistical analysis can be misleading. 
2. Policymaking Community  
It is possible that politicians had too much imagination in the realm of methods 
terrorists would most likely employ.  The attack by the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo 
using sarin nerve gas on a Tokyo subway started an obsession amongst U.S. policy 
makers who were concerned that a “new threshold in terrorist experience had 
materialized.”43   Hoffman furthers the viewpoint of the government’s obsession with 
these weapons and highlights the debate between policy makers and academics.  
Academics had a skeptical view on their potential use while policy makers were 
“plowing fullsteam ahead” in planning for the worst-case scenario.44  Few observers, 
however, have provided evidence of an obsession by senior policy makers concerning 
WMD terrorism, and this thesis will attempt to find evidence supporting or disproving 
this argument. 
3. Intelligence Community 
In her examination of the 9/11 intelligence failures, Amy Zegart provides analysis 
of the organizational and cultural obstacles that have kept intelligence organizations from 
adapting to current threats and challenges.  She highlights that many recognized the need 
for reform within the intelligence community after the Cold War.  This acknowledgement 
                                                 
41 Andrew Silke, “An Introduction to Terrorist Research,” in Research on Terrorism Trends, 
Achievements and Failures, ed. Andrew Silke (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2004), 24. 
42 Silke, “The Road Less Traveled,” 186–211. 
43 David C. Rappoport, "The Fourth Wave:  September 11 in the History of Terrorism," Current 
History 100, no. 650 (2004): 422. 
44 Bruce Hoffman, "The Debate over Future Terrorist Use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 
Nuclear Weapons," in Hype or Reality:  The "New Terrorism" and Casualty Attacks, ed. Brad Roberts 
(Alexandria, VA: The Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 2000), 220. 
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is traced through multiple government commissions providing recommendations for 
change that were not implemented or followed up.  A dangerous trend is shown where 
over the course of these commissions, they all made similar recommendations.  Zegart 
provides a consolidated source of these commissions, but does not look at any particular 
issue intelligence agencies focused on prior to 9/11.45  Many have described the failings 
of the intelligence community, including Zegart, but little has been done about what 
intelligence analysts and agencies wrote or warned about WMD terrorism. 
F. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis will ask whether the academic, policymaking and intelligence 
communities were obsessed with CBRN terrorism.  A process-tracing method is used to 
examine the focus on WMD within these three distinct groups from conceptual origin 
through 9/11.  If this obsession is found to exist, then we will consider whether this was a 
contributing factor in the overall catastrophic failure to anticipate the use of suicide-
hijackings on the attacks of 9/11.   
Sources for this thesis include only documents and literature at the unclassified 
level.  Much of the testimony that is examined in the policymaking and intelligence 
community contained both an open and closed session.  Information that was divulged in 
the classified sessions was not available.  
The search within the academic community examined the literature published 
from the time when the obsession with CBRN terrorism began to rise (after the 1995 
Aum Shinrikyo attack) through 9/11.  This thesis reviews Silke’s statistical analysis of 
the two leading journals in the field of terrorism studies will be conducted.  Silke 
analyzes the academic focus prior to 9/11 through a statistical analysis of authors 
(profiling number of articles and books published and their backgrounds), country focus, 
regional focus, terrorist group focus, and group ideology.46   
                                                 
45 Amy B. Zegart, Spying Blind:  The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2007). 
46 Silke, "The Road Less Travelled:  Recent Trends in Terrorism Research." 
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Analysis of the intelligence and policy examined numerous intelligence reform 
commissions conducted prior to 9/11.  These commissions are nicely summarized in 
Zegart’s book, and they will be further investigated for any CBRN terrorism focus.  
Declassified intelligence reports and literature from former intelligence officers will also 
be examined.  Policy statements of the executive and legislative branches will be 
examined for any WMD terrorism obsession within these documents.  Other sources will 
include Congressional Hearings and Testimony, Congressional Research Service (CRS) 
Reports, and Government Accounting Office (GAO) Reports. 
G. OVERVIEW 
This thesis is organized around the search for obsession with CBRN terrorism 
within three separate communities:  academic, policymaking, and intelligence.  A 
separate chapter will be used for each in search of physical evidence of obsession with 
CBRN terrorism.  As stated up front, the starting hypothesis that any or all of these 
communities were obsessed with CBRN terrorism is unable to be proven amongst the 
literature that exists at the unclassified level.  All were concerned with CBRN terrorism 
to some degree, but not clinically obsessed.  As will be discussed in the concluding 
chapter, if anything, 9/11 triggered an obsession with CBRN terrorism, a mistake that has 
cost our nation a large sum of our national treasures, men, women, and money.  
Obsession with high-consequence, low-probability events is blinding us to the more 
likely scenarios eating away at our limited resource pool. 
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II. ACADEMIC COMMUNITY  
Academia has strong links to the intelligence and policymaking community, and 
has the ability to influence both.  Some politicians have gone so far as to call academic 
work open-source intelligence (OSINT).  During the Congressional Joint Inquiry on the 
intelligence community prior to 9/11, Senator Mike Dewine called a Library of Congress 
(LOC) report OSINT.  He states, "We must remember that open-source information was 
used to warn investigators in 1999 that al-Qaeda terrorists might fly a hijacked airliner 
into American buildings."47  What was actually said in the LOC report was, "Suicide 
bomber(s) belonging to al-Qaida's Martyrdom Battalion could crash-land an aircraft 
packed with high explosives (C-4 and semtex) into the Pentagon, the headquarters of the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), or the White House."48  While the merits of these 
claims are outside the scope of this thesis, it is important to establish the role and impact 
academia can have on both the policymaking and intelligence communities. 
If academic work can be used as an intelligence resource, then it is plausible that 
in addition to the intelligence failure on 9/11, an academic failure also occurred.  Andrew 
Silke has suggested that the academic community experienced such a failure:  “If the 
failure to mark out the importance of al-Qa’eda was the biggest oversight in research 
prior to 9/11, the obsession with work on WMD threats—as opposed to more mundane 
tactics—will likely be judged as the second most significant failing.”49  Silke makes the 
claim but provides insufficient evidence in support of his argument.   
As discussed in the literature review, before 9/11 there was a debate amongst 
academics over whether or not a new type of superterrorism was emerging.  This chapter 
will attempt to determine whether the concern over superterrorism was prevalent at a 
sufficient level to constitute obsession within the academic community.  
                                                 
47 Mike Dewine,   "Additional Comments Joint Inquiry Staff Report," in Joint Inquiry into Intelligence 
Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, (Washington, D.C., 
December 18, 2002), 6. 
48 Rex A. Hudson, The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism:  Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why? 
(Washington, D.C.:  Library of Congress, September 1999), 7. 
49 Silke, "An Introduction to Terrorist Research," 24. 
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This chapter will start with a poll of academics in 1985 that asked the community 
their belief on the likelihood of a CBRN terrorist incident.  This will help set the stage for 
the remainder of the chapter.  Silke's statistical analysis will be reexamined and used as a 
starting point for a broader statistical analysis of the two major journals within the field 
of terrorism studies, Terrorism and Political Violence (TPV) and Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism (SCT).  A study of the topics terrorism experts were publishing on within the 
era will also be analyzed.  Finally, the scope of Silke's research will be expanded beyond 
the two primary journals.  This will help to more completely answer the question of 
whether the academic community was obsessed with CBRN terrorism prior to 9/11.   
When Silke is reexamined, his claim of WMD obsession appears overblown.  
However, a considerable amount of attention was paid to the threat of CBRN terrorism.  
The experts who viewed superterrorism as a serious threat to U.S. security had the ear of 
politicians, and subsequently were able to influence policy.   
A. POLL DATA 
It is not uncommon for academic communities to poll their members concerning 
important issues.  Prior to 9/11, only one such poll regarding the likelihood of CBRN 
terrorism was conducted within the academic community.  Brian Jenkins cites the 
following:  “According to a poll conducted in 1985 by TVI Report, a quarterly journal 
devoted to the study of political violence, 69 percent of the readers responding (mainly 
government officials and members of the research community) thought it likely that 
terrorists would employ chemical weapons by the end of the century, while the use of 
biological or nuclear weapons by the year 2000 was considered unlikely.”50  A belief 
suggesting that these experts considered an act of CBRN terrorism likely, does not by 
itself promote the obsession claim.  In order to establish a link between the likelihood of 
and obsession with CBRN terrorism, one must look to the work that these academics and 
government officials conducted. 
                                                 
50 Brian Jenkins, "Understanding the Link between Motives and Methods," in Terrorism with 
Chemical and Biological Weapons:  Calibrating Risks and Responses, ed. Brad Roberts(Alexandria, VA: 
The Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 1997), 43. 
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B. SILKE REVISITED  
Andrew Silke has been conducting statistical analysis of the terrorism academic 
community since 2001.  He provided subsequent updates in 2004, 2006, and 2008.  His 
sources only include the two main peer-reviewed journals within the terrorism field, TPV 
and SCT.   His methodology involved the construction of a database that looked at the 
following categories of each article published during the 1990s:  geographic, temporal, 
terrorist group, terrorist tactic, conceptual focus, data-gathering methods, and statistical 
analysis methods.51  Any article that included CBRN terrorism, as a terrorist tactic, 
would be counted as an article focused on CBRN terrorism.  This brings up a 
shortcoming in his research.  Some of these articles are not focused on CBRN terrorism; 
they merely mention it as one of the many weapons of the terrorist group, and not as the 
focus of the article.  After compiling his database Silke reached the conclusion that “Prior 
to 9/11, nearly six times more research was being conducted on CBRN terrorist tactics 
than on suicide tactics.  Indeed no other terrorist tactic (from car-bombings, hijackings, 
assassinations, etc.) received anywhere near as much research attention in the run up to 
9/11 as CBRN.”52  Taken without further analysis, Silke's work would appear to support 
the idea that the academic community was obsessed with CBRN terrorism.   
If one looks closely at the numbers presented in his study there are some 
contradictory statistics.  In one chart used to compare CBRN focus before and after 9/11, 
only 2.7 percent of the research prior to 9/11 was focused on CBRN terrorism.53  He 
shows that this number doubles after 9/11, but 5.4 percent of the literature on one 
category is not nearly as obsessive as his previous statistic (six times as much research 
was conducted on CBRN terrorism than suicide tactics).  It is thus necessary to 
reexamine Silke's statistical work with a little more scrutiny. 
                                                 
51 Andrew Silke, "Research on Terrorism:  A Review of the Impact of 9/11 and the Global War on 
Terrorism," in Terrorism Informatics:  Knowledge Management and Data Mining for Homeland Security, 
ed. Hsinchun Chen, Edna Reid, Joshua Sinai, Andrew Silke, and Boaz Ganor (New York: Springer, 2008), 
48. 
52 Ibid.,  43. 
53 Ibid. 
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1. Terrorism and Political Violence 
In an effort to broaden the scope of Silke's work, the following key word searches 
were conducted (from the first issue in 1990 until the 10th of September 2001) within the 
Taylor Francis online database (home of TPV current and archived issues):  WMD, 
CBRN, nuclear terrorism, chemical terrorism, and biological terrorism.  The table below 
summarizes the number of returns: 
Keyword Number of Articles 
Returned (Duplicated in 
other categories) 
Percentage of Total (348 
Articles from 1990 
through Vol. 13 Issue 3) 
WMD 18 5.1% 
CBRN 5 (2) 1.4 % 
Nuclear Terrorism 17 (7) 4.8 % 
Chemical Terrorism 9 (8) 2.5% 
Biological Terrorism 10 (9) 2.8% 
Table 1.   TPV Articles Related to CBRN Terrorism 
In total there were 33 articles covering the range of topics equating to 9.4 percent 
of the literature within TPV referring to CBRN terrorism.  This falls short of obsession.  
However, prior to 9/11 TPV devoted an entire issue to "The WMD Problem."54  While 
this is significant as an indicator of an increased focus on CBRN terrorism, nine percent 
does not further the obsession claim. 
2. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 
The same methodology was used for analyzing SCT as was used in the analysis of 
TPV.  Data was examined from the first issue in 1990 through the issue prior to the 9/11 
attacks yielding a total of 247 articles.  The table below summarizes the keyword search 
within the Taylor Francis online database: 
 
                                                 
54 Terrorism and Political Violence 13, no. 3 (2001). 
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Keyword Number of Articles 
Returned (Duplicated in 
other categories) 
Percentage of Total (247 
Articles from 1990 to 
2001 Issue 5) 
WMD 14 5.6% 
CBRN 6 (5) 2.4% 
Nuclear Terrorism 13 (5) 5.2 % 
Chemical Terrorism 2 (2) < 1% 
Biological Terrorism 8 (7) 3.2% 
Table 2.   SCT Articles Related to CBRN Terrorism 
Without looking at repeat articles, 24 total articles contained one or more of the 
five keywords examined in the chart above.  This indicated 9.7 percent of the total 
articles with any mention of CBRN terrorism. 
Both journals within the field yielded approximately the same result.  TPV had 
9.4 percent of its articles related to CBRN terrorism while SCT had 9.7 percent.  Again, 
this shows an interest in CBRN terrorism amongst the academic community, but it is just 
one of the many areas of focus.  A community obsessed with CBRN terrorism would be 
one where the vast majority of articles were focused on the subject.  Also, if an obsession 
existed, the best minds within the field would be focused on the hot topic of the day. 
C. THE "EXPERTS"  
Schmid and Jongman first defined terrorism experts when they conducted an 
examination of the state of knowledge within the terrorism field.  In an effort to 
determine who the experts were within the field, they sent out a questionnaire to thirty-
three prominent scholars within the field of terrorism asking, "Who are the leading 
authors in the field?"55  The table below summarizes their findings: 
                                                 
55 Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman, Political Terrorism:  A New Guide to Actors, Authors, 
Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, & Literature, 3rd ed. (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2008). 
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Number of Citations Author 
20-25 Jenkins, Wilkinson 
15-19 Bell, Alexander 
10-14 Schmid, Clutterbuck, Mickolus, 
Friedlander, Kupperman, Miller, Sterling, 
Stohl, Wardlaw, Arendt, Bassiouni 
3-4 Citations Carlton, Ferrarcuti, Merari, Sloan, 
Thornton, Wolf, Cline, Cooper, Crozier, 
Dobson, Payne, E. Evans, Gurr, Hacker, 
Horowitz, Livingston, Paust, Walter 
Table 3.   Terrorism Experts According to Schmid and Jongman 
For example, out of 33 questionnaires 20–25 people acknowledged Brian Jenkins 
as an expert.  Interestingly, 33 questionnaires yielded 33 experts.  If these authors were 
focused on CBRN terrorism, an obsession claim would be justifiable. 
Were any of these experts publishing articles on CBRN terrorism during the time 
period?  The leading experts, according to Schmid and Jongman, both published articles 
on CBRN terrorism.  Brian Jenkins published "Terrorism and Beyond:  a 21st Century 
Perspective."  Paul Wilkinson published two articles in TPV, "Technology and 
Terrorism" and "Enhancing Global Aviation Security."  Other CBRN terrorism related 
articles included:  a conference report by Alexander, "The George Washington University 
Conferences on Terrorism; Superterrorism:  Biological, Chemical, and Nuclear" and an 
article published by Merrari, "Terrorism as a Strategy of Struggle:  Past and Future."  Of 
all of these experts, the article with the most CBRN focus was Schmid's "Terrorism and 
the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction:  From where the Risk?" in 1999.  This shows 
that very few of the experts focused on CBRN terrorism, as there were many issues to 
examine within the terrorism field.  This points further away from obsession, and more 
towards balance.   
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Silke is not satisfied with the Schmid and Jongman list, and he expanded it 
through his study of TPV and SCT.  On the Schmid and Jongman study he notes, "While 
the 1988 survey was unquestionably a measure of perceived quality, and this survey is 
essentially more a measure of quantity, the emergence of these other wrtiers to the 
forefront of the field (at least in terms of output) does seem to indicate the arrival of new 
leading figures in the field."56  Silke gives an author prolific status for crossing the 
threshold of three total articles published from 1990–1999. Were any of his prolific 
authors focused on WMD terrorism? 
The 22 prolific authors identified by Silke within TPV combined to publish a total 
of 93 articles from 1990 - 9/11.  Several of the authors collaborated on the same articles 
and those were not counted in these numbers.  Of these 93 articles, only 9 had any 
mention of WMD or CBRN terrorism, 9.6 percent.   Within those 9 articles many had a 
brief mention of CBRN terrorism, and only Schmid's "Terrorism and the Use of Weapons 
of Mass Destruction:  From where the Risk?" was completely devoted to the topic.  
Experts publishing within TPV were concerned about CBRN terrorism, but it was only 
one of the many issues in terrorism studies. 
Silke's 18 experts within SCT published 43 articles from 1990 to 9/11 with only 7 
having any mention of CBRN terrorism.  Thus 16.2 percent of the articles from the 
experts dealt with CBRN terrorism, but only one was devoted to the topic, Rosenau's 
2001 article "Aum Shinrikyo's Biological Weapons Program:  Why did it Fail?"  Once 
again, the experts were not obsessed with CBRN terrorism. 
Narrowly defining the experts as those who publish frequently within the narrow 
focus of these two journals misses some truly prolific contributors to the field, such as 
those who publish books, studies, and within other related journals (proliferation and 
political science for example).  Richard Falkenrath wrote one of the most important 
works on the issue of CBRN terrorism, America's Achilles Heel, yet he only published 
one article in SCT during the timeframe.  Nuclear terrorism expert Brian Jenkins, also 
published one article within SCT.  Chemical and biological weapons expert Gavin 
                                                 
56 Silke, "The Road Less Travelled:  Recent Trends in Terrorism Research," 193. 
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Cameron is also only published once in SCT, yet published many books on the subject.  
These many examples show the need to expand the analysis further to other sources. 
D. BIBLIOGRAPHIC STUDIES 
To investigate the full range of literature, one must look beyond the primary 
journals.  The Library of Congress (LOC) first published a bibliography on terrorism in 
1989, with subsequent updates in 1993 and 1998.  The 1993 bibliography incorporated 
the earlier work of a 1989 product and was titled Combatting Terrorism:  Literature on 
Future Trends in Terrorism.  Sponsored by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense, Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict, the Federal Research Division of the 
Library of Congress created the bibliography "to provide officials in decision making 
positions quick access to the literature in the field to help them make informed policy 
decisions."57  As shown in the introduction to this chapter, products by the LOC were 
seen in hindsight as open-source intelligence.  Thus if these products were obsessive 
relative to CBRN terrorism, it is likely this feeling could be impressed upon the 
policymaking community. This section will examine LOC CBRN terrorism 
bibliographies in search of obsession. 
Sources of the bibliography included "books, articles, doctoral dissertations, and 
government and congressional reports on terrorism mostly from 1989 to mid-1993."58  
Within the bibliography, the authors identified 54 different keywords within the 338 
sources.  Of significance to this thesis were the keywords "biological weapons," 
"chemical weapons," and "nuclear weapons."  All uses of these keywords were associated 
with writings on terrorism.  An analysis of how frequently these keywords appeared as 
compared to the other 51 keywords will help determine if a preoccupation with CBRN 
terrorism existed. 
The study found the keyword "nuclear weapons" in 16 sources, "chemical 
weapons" appeared four times, and "biological weapons" was cited 8 times.  Biological 
                                                 
57 Library of Congress Federal Research Division, Combatting Terrorism:  Literature on Future 
Trends in Terrorism, (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, June 1993), Preface. 
58 Ibid. 
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weapons made up 2.3 percent of the articles, chemical weapons 1.1 percent, and nuclear 
weapons 4.7 percent.  In total 28 appearances of any of these keywords occurred.  Only 
8.2 percent of the total number of sources was concerned with CBRN terrorism.  These 
numbers do not show a fascination with CBRN terrorism within the wider field of 
literature of the time.  A closer look at the sources within the bibliography revealed 
different numbers. 
Conducting a keyword search of the terms nuclear, chemical, and biological 
within the actual document revealed different numbers than presented in the findings by 
the LOC researchers.  Some articles went uncounted in the nuclear, chemical, and 
biological keywords and were instead counted under the "future trends" keyword.  Not 
counting the articles that were repeated under multiple keywords, this study revealed a 
total of 42 of 338 sources related to CBRN terrorism, 12.4 percent.  While slightly 
different than the analysis by the authors of the bibliography, the trend still shows 
concerns over CBRN terrorism.  But, these concerns did not dominate research during the 
time period.  Did this change with time as a result of terrorist attacks in the late 1990s?   
The 1998 bibliography covered 1996 to mid-1998 with every annotation from 
openly published literature on future trends in terrorism.  Sources included 295 works 
from journals, news magazines, newspapers, and monographs with many of the 295 
articles focusing on NBC threats.  The authors of the bibliography found that, “The 
dominant trend discussed in this literature is the increasing likelihood that terrorists will 
use weapons of mass destruction (WMD), particularly against the United States.”59  In 
order to assess this conclusion, an evaluation of the literature within the bibliography was 
conducted. 
Of the 295 sources, 209 contained key words related to CBRN terrorism 
(CBRNC; chemical weapons of mass destruction; chemical terrorism; chemical, 
biological nuclear agents; nuclear weapons of mass destruction; bio-agent detection; 
WMD in urban areas; biological weapons of mass destruction; biological 
decontamination; chemical decontamination).  At face value, this would be striking 
                                                 
59 LaVerle Berry, Glenn Curtis, and Rex Hudson, Bibliography on Future Trends in Terrorism 
(Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, September 1998), preface. 
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evidence in support of an obsession claim, with 71 percent of the sources related to 
CBRN terrorism.  A closer examination of these sources revealed some issues with the 
data.   
Many of the sources were from the popular media including the New York Times, 
Newsweek, Aviation Week and Space Technology, The Guardian, The New Yorker, US 
News and World Report, and Business Week.  Also included were several sources of 
questionable reputability including Soldier of Fortune, SWAT, and Covert Action 
Quarterly.  Of the 209 sources the Library of Congress lists as related to CBRN 
terrorism, 84 were from other popular literature or the news.  Also, 22 of the articles were 
in response to an article written by chemical and biological terrorism expert David 
Tucker.  Essentially 106 sources can be removed from the original 209, making 103 of 
295 sources legitimate.  Approximately 34 percent of the legitimate sources contained 
within the 1998 Library of Congress bibliography were focused on CBRN terrorism.  
This increase is significant and undoubtedly focus was shifting towards CBRN terrorism, 
but the addition of questionable sources makes the data questionable.   
E. CONCLUSION 
Silke's statistics can be misleading without a contextual examination, and alone 
do not justify the claim of obsession.  His study showed only 2.7 percent of the research 
done within the two primary journals was focused on CBRN terrorism, a far cry from 
obsession.  Silke’s research also has a narrow focus, only looking at CBRN terrorism 
within the literature of the two main journals for terrorism:  Terrorism and Political 
Violence and Studies in Conflict &Terrorism.  He does not evaluate any other type of 
published literature that might have had a CBRN terrorism focus, nor does he look at the 
wider spectrum of scholarly journals that have published articles on CBRN terrorism (for 
example proliferation journals).   
The statistical analysis within the two major journals would point to a lack of 
obsession within the academic community concerning the likelihood of CBRN terrorism.  
Expanding the field of literature provides similar results.  A review of the LOC 
bibliographies shows an increasing concern with CBRN terrorism, but it was not 
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overwhelming compared to other concerns.  Academia was clearly focused on CBRN 
terrorism as an important issue of the time, but obsession is too strong a word. 
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III. POLICYMAKERS  
Policymakers first realized the grave threat America faced from terrorism 
following the first World Trade Center Bombing on February 26, 1993.  Arguably, the 
first international terrorist attack on US soil resulted in the breaching of a psychological 
security barrier by the American public.60  This combined with the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo 
sarin gas attacks on the Tokyo subway brought about an extreme concern over CBRN 
terrorism amongst the political leadership of our country.  In response policy makers took 
different measures to reform national security policy.  Some viewed these measures as 
going overboard and obsessive.  David Claridge called superterrorism "...a defining 
obsession of the Clinton administration, comparable to Ronald Regan's fear-mongering 
Soviet 'evil empire'."61  Claridge makes this claim with little support, citing only Clinton's 
fascination with a fiction book, The Cobra Event.  This chapter will examine the 
policymaking community from the 1990s until 9/11 in search of evidence to support or 
refute the argument that policymakers were obsessed with CBRN terrorism. 
In order to analyze the policymaking community, the community must first be 
defined.  Prior to 9/11, more than 40 agencies had a role in counterterrorism.  
Counterterrorism policy was coordinated by the National Security Council (NSC).62  At 
that time, the NSC consisted of the President, Vice President, Secretaries of State, 
Defense, and Energy, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS).63  This chapter will investigate CBRN terrorism 
obsession within the applicable elements from the policymaking community:  executive 
branch, State Department, Department of Defense (DoD).  Analysis of the CIA will be 
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conducted in the next chapter.  Also included will be a Congressional analysis, as they 
provide funding and legislation relative to counterterrorism. 
Analysis of the policymaking community will begin with several surveys 
conducted in the 1990s that examine public and leadership perceptions on national 
security threats.  These survey results show that policymakers were less concerned with 
terrorism and CBRN terrorism than the general public.  This chapter will also examine 
reform within the government concerning counterterrorism during the 1990s.  Following 
the Cold War, the national security apparatus was changing to meet new threats.  How 
concerned were these institutions with CBRN terrorism?  Finally, a review of the 
executive and legislative branches of government will be conducted in search of 
obsession.  Were the actions of policy makers obsessive concerning CBRN terrorism? 
A. LEADERSHIP SURVEYS 
The Chicago Council on Foreign relations conducts a survey every four years, in 
which it surveys both the American public and leadership.  An examination of the 1995 
and 1999 studies will show a linkage between public perceptions and policymaker 
attitudes concerning CBRN terrorism. 
Applicable to this research, are the 1995 and 1999 surveys that involved over 
1,500 citizens and 379 leaders.  Surveyed leaders included members of the House and 
Senate as well as other groups knowledgeable in international affairs to include: business, 
media, academics, and policy institutions.64  The table below shows the perceptions of 
the most dangerous threats to U.S. interests from the 1995 survey: 
 
 
                                                 
64 The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, "American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy 
1999," ed. John E. Reilly (Chicago: The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1999), 3. 
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Figure 1.   1995 Perceived Threats to National Security (From 65) 
Related to issues of CBRN terrorism in this study are the threats of nuclear 
proliferation and international terrorism.  Unfriendly countries proliferating nuclear 
technology or weapons to terrorist groups is a worst-case scenario.  Public opinion was 
most concerned with nuclear proliferation, with 72 percent of those surveyed believing 
                                                 
65 The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, "American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy 
1995," ed. John E. Reilly (Chicago: The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1995), 21. 
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this to be a critical threat.  This category was also the highest concern for leadership, with 
61 percent finding nuclear proliferation as a critical threat.  Also of interest is the gap of 
36 percentage points between the public and leadership over international terrorism.  
Leadership appeared to be less concerned about international terrorism than the public.  
The 1995 data shows a concern with both proliferation and terrorism, but this alone does 
not indicate an obsession.  A comparison of the 1995 and 1999 polls will be useful to 
determine changes in attitudes relative to CBRN terrorism. 
From April 19, 1995 until August 7, 1998, the U.S. experienced three major 
terrorist attacks against its interests.  In the largest domestic terrorist attack on our soil, 
the Oklahoma City bombing resulted in 168 dead and 600 wounded.  Khobar Towers, a 
military housing facility in Saudi Arabia was bombed on June 25, 1996, resulting in 19 
Americans killed and 240 Americans wounded.  The most devastating of attacks were the 
multiple U.S. embassy bombings on August 7, 1998 that resulted in 301 total deaths and 
5,077 people wounded.  Combined with the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo Sarin attacks, public 
attitudes on terrorism drastically changed.  The table below shows the survey results of 
threat perceptions from the 1999 study: 
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Figure 2.   1999 Perceived Threats to National Security (From 66) 
Public fears over international terrorism significantly increased from 69 percent to 
84 percent from 1995 to 1999.  Leadership now placed international terrorism at the top 
of the threat list with a 28-point increase from the 1995 poll.  Nuclear proliferation fears 
remained roughly the same between the two surveys.  What is significant is the 
emergence of chemical and biological weapons as a critical threat.  Prior to 1999, they 
were not on the list of significant threats.   
Citizens and leaders alike became more concerned with international terrorism as 
the nation moved towards the new millennium.  Fears of chemical, biological, and 
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1999," 15. 
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nuclear proliferation were viewed as a significant threat to U.S. vital interests.  Obsessive 
behavior cannot be proven with these statistics alone.  An examination of how politicians 
reacted in the wake of these new threats and attitudes is necessary to prove or disprove 
obsession. 
B. POLICY COMMISSIONS 
Following the Cold War, policymakers realized threats to U.S. national security 
had changed significantly.  Subsequently, 12 commissions, studies, and task forces were 
conducted to examine U.S. counterterrorism policy, the intelligence community, and the 
law enforcement community.67  In her study of these commissions, Amy Zegart looks at 
intelligence and non-intelligence recommendations that were made and whether these 
were implemented.  She concludes that prior to 9/11, U.S. intelligence agencies were 
unable to adapt to the evolving terrorist threat.68  The relevant question to this thesis thus 
becomes, were policymakers or intelligence agencies unable to adjust to the threat 
because they were obsessed with WMD terrorism? 
Zegart categorized the 12 commissions by primary topic into three categories:  
intelligence, law enforcement, and counterterrorism.   
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68 Ibid.,  35. 
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Percent of Study 
Council on Foreign 
Relations 




Intelligence 35 0 35 100% 
National Institute 
for Public Policy 
Intelligence 34 0 34 100% 
House Intelligence 
Comm. Staff 
Intelligence 74 1 75 99% 
Aspin-Brown 
Commission  
Intelligence 38 1 39 97% 
20th Century Fund Intelligence 17 1 18 94% 
FBI Strategic Plan 
1998 
Law Enforcement 54 6 60 90% 
Webster 
Commission 
Law Enforcement 10 11 21 48% 
Bremer 
Commission 





17 40 57 30% 
Gilmore 
Commission 
Counterterrorism 14 46 60 23% 
Hart-Rudman Counterterrorism 6 44 50 12% 
Total  340 174 514 66% 
Table 4.   Summary of Commissions Reviewed by Zegart (From 69) 
This section will examine those commissions where intelligence was less than 50 
percent of the total concentration, as identified by Zegart.  The other commissions and 
studies with an intelligence focus will be examined in the next chapter.   
Five of the 12 studies have a non-intelligence focus.  Were any of these studies 
obsessively focused on CBRN terrorism?   
                                                 
69 Zegart, 32. 
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The next section will review the five counterterror and law enforcement commissions to 
examine what were determined to be the greatest threats to national security and where 
CBRN terrorism ranked within those threats. 
1. 1998 FBI Strategic Plan 
In response to the changing security environment and both international and 
domestic terrorist attacks on U.S. soil, the FBI began to reexamine its priorities.  The plan 
for this change was released in draft form in May of 1998.  This report is unavailable, but 
the new priorities outlined by this plan have been cited elsewhere.  According to the 
strategic plan, the FBI highest priorities were national and economic security, which was 
defined as "foreign intelligence, terrorist, and criminal activities that directly threaten the 
national or economic security of the United States."70  The following graphic depicts FBI 
priorities according to the strategic plan: 
                                                 
70 U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General Audit Division, "Federal Bureau of 
Investigation Casework and Human Resource Allocation:  Audit Report 03-37,"  (September 2003), ii. 
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Figure 3.    1998 FBI Strategic Plan Priorities (From 71) 
Nowhere within these goals is any mention of CBRN terrorism.  Without access 
to the original document to view any subsets of these tiers and goals, FBI attention to 
CBRN terrorism prior to 9/11 will be difficult to examine.  The Inspector General (IG) 
report where the Strategic Plan goals were obtained listed WMD as a subset of the 
domestic counterterrorism program, but provided no further information on the program.   
                                                 
71 U.S. DOJ Office of the IG Audit Division, iii. 
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Unrelated to the strategic plan, but important to the search for obsession with CBRN 
terrorism, the remainder of this section will address the FBI's focus on WMD terrorism 
prior to 9/11. 
Prior to 9/11 the FBI had two units responsible for WMD.  The operational unit is 
concerned with "operations, cases, and threats, which reportedly tripled in 1997 over 
1996 figures."72  A support unit covers a countermeasure program, conducts exercises, 
and assists in first responder training.  Over 100 cases involving WMD were investigated 
by the FBI in 1997.  Did this increase in caseload subsequently increase obsession?  
Thirty interagency exercises involving CBRN incidents were conducted between October 
1994 and March 1997.73  If these exercises occurred more frequently than other types, 
does this point to an obsession? 
The following summarizes the FBI counterterrorism budget from 1995–1999: 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
$256.1M $344.9M $481.5M $581.2M $608.6M 
Table 5.   FBI Counterterrorism Budget 1995–199974  
Counterterrorism funds more than doubled from 1995 to 1999.  This would point to an 
enhanced concern with terrorism in general.  An examination of CBRN terrorism budget 
items is difficult because a lack of specific numbers and incomplete reporting.  A GAO 
report broke down some spending categorically only in 1997 and 1998.  In 1997, $22.9 
million was spent on counterterrorism personnel directly associated with CBRN terrorism 
(the majority of this money was used for CBRN investigations).  This equals roughly 
27.6 percent of the overall personnel budget in 1997 (corresponding to the increased 
number of CBRN investigations, mostly hoaxes).75  Non-personnel expenditures related 
to CBRN terrorism was only $6 million, 11.7 percent of the overall non-personnel 
                                                 
72 See note 3, United States General Acounting Office, "Combating Terrorism:  FBI's Use of Federal 
Funds for Counterterrorism-Related Activities (FYs 1995–98) GAO-GGD-99–7,"  (Washington, D.C.: 
GAO, November 1998), 26. 
73 Ibid., 32. 
74 Ibid., 8. 
75 Ibid., 40. 
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budget.76  Allocations in 1998 were not specified for personnel.  Non-personnel expenses 
related to CBRN were $7 million, approximately 13 percent of overall non-personnel 
expenditures.77  Financial data is incomplete, and what data is available clearly points to 
an increased concern with terrorism in general, but not obsession with CBRN terrorism.  
CBRN terrorism was a new concern that had not been addressed by the government prior 
to this point.  Increased spending merely points to the significant cost in bringing new 
programs online. 
2. Webster Commission (2000) 
As a result of the Robert Hanssen espionage case, the Commission for the Review 
of FBI Security Programs was established.  Headed by William Webster, the Webster 
Commission was charged with analyzing and recommending changes to the FBI security 
program.78  The commission was not concerned with WMD terrorism. 
3. Bremer Commission (2000) 
In response to growing threats and concerns over terrorism in the late 1990s, 
Congress created the National Commission on Terrorism to "...evaluate U.S. laws, 
policies, and practices for preventing and punishing terrorism aimed at U.S. citizens."79 
Zegart's analysis of the Bremer Commission examined the number of intelligence and 
non-intelligence recommendations.  She counted 36 total recommendations made by the 
Bremer Commission, 12 intelligence and 24 non-intelligence recommendations.80  To 
expand her analysis to this thesis, one must look at the specific recommendations to 
determine if the commission had an excessive WMD focus.   
The Bremer Commission mentions CBRN terrorism as the number four of the 
five total recommendations: "A terrorist attack involving a biological agent, deadly 
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chemicals, or nuclear or radiological material, even if it succeeds only partially, could 
profoundly affect the entire nation.  The government must do more to prepare for such an 
event."81 At first glance, this appears to suggest that CBRN terrorism was not the top 
priority.  Policymakers obsessed with CBRN terrorism would have made this the number 
one recommendation.  If it were, this might better support an obsession claim.  A careful 
examination of the commission's recommendations is needed to support or refute 
obsession. 
This study of the Bremer Commission found 37 total recommendations (Zegart 
excludes some "because they suggested no actionable steps or focused narrowly on cost 
savings").82  These recommendations were further classified under the following groups:  
CIA, FBI, Counterterrorism, information sharing, foreign policy, terrorism financing, 
legal reform, budget, and CBRN. 
 
Figure 4.   Bremer Commission Recommendations83 
Approximately one quarter of the recommendations were related to countering 
CBRN terrorism.  This number shows a significant focus on CBRN terrorism, but falls 
                                                 
81 National Commission on Terrorism (Bremer Commission), "Countering the Changing Threat of 
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82 Zegart, 201. 
83 Bremer Commission. 
 43 
short of evidence of obsession.  It supports the findings from the FBI study, where the 
focus is making up for the lack of a previous capability, and further shows 
counterterrorism and proliferation as but one of the many national security concerns. 
4. Deutch Commission (1998–1999) 
Congress tasked the Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal 
Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Deutch 
Commission) to "assess the organization of the Federal Government with regard to WMD 
proliferation and to make recommendations for improvements."84  Established in 1998, 
the commission made its final report on July 14, 1999.  The commission found five key 
worries to U.S. security.  They found the most serious threat to the United States as the 
"terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States or its allies..."85 
Other concerns included:  manufacturing capability and stockpiles of CBRN weapons of 
"Iran, Iraq, North Korea, or other unfriendly states;" Russian "weapons, technology, 
materials, and expertise" flowing to other nations; China as a proliferator of "ballistic 
missiles, weapons of mass destruction, and enabling technologies;" and the destabilizing 
effect of WMD programs throughout the world.86  Ultimately the commission found "that 
the US Government is not effectively organized to combat proliferation."87 
The 57 recommendations made by the commission focus on nonproliferation and 
counterproliferation.  A review of the recommendations found 79 percent to deal with 
nonproliferation, 19 percent other (topics included intelligence sharing, analysis and 
estimates, budget transfers, FBI automated information systems, improved FBI-CIA 
coordination, and vaccine stockpiles) and 2 percent counterterrorism.  This is still 
significant in that CBRN terrorism is less likely to happen if terrorists are unable to 
obtain the weapons.  Given the technical issues with a group constructing their own 
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weapon, it is more likely that a group would acquire weapons through black markets or 
state-sponsors, a proliferation issue.  The commission highlighted the fact that the U.S. 
government had not seriously addressed the threat of CBRN terrorism and 
nonproliferation.  While the fact this commission was established showed an interest in 
WMD, it is not surprising that a WMD commission would focus on CBRN terrorism 
threats, and thus does not help support an obsession claim.   
5. Gilmore Commission (1999–2000) 
The Commission to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism 
Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (Gilmore Commission) was also focused solely 
on CBRN terrorism.  At first glance, another report with this narrow focus might support 
the obsession claim.  This report starts with the statement, "The possibility that terrorists 
will use 'weapons of mass destruction (WMD)' in this country to kill and injure 
Americans, including those responsible for protecting and saving lives, presents a 
genuine threat to the United States."88  In their analysis, the commission uses a 
methodology similar to the one outlined in Chapter II, focusing on capability and intent.  
They conclude that it would be difficult for terrorists to gain CBRN weapons, but ".... 
such a catastrophic event is within the realm of possibility.  Therefore, the panel believes 
that comprehensive capabilities must be developed to respond to incidents across a broad 
spectrum."89   
Despite the focus of the long-term commission on CBRN terrorism, the 
commission does not take an obsessive view of the threat, although they indicate "...too 
much of the Federal effort to date—even those programs that ostensibly are designed to 
enhance state and local response capabilities—has been predicated on the tacit 
assumption that preparing for the 'worst case' will automatically encompass lesser 
threats."90 Contrary to the actions of the government, the commission urges balance 
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between catastrophic threats and the more likely conventional weapons terrorists have 
traditionally employed.  They note that a successful CBRN terrorist attack would cause 
great harm but "...it is highly unlikely that it could ever completely undermine the 
national security, much less the survival, of the United States as a nation."91  Such a 
statement undermines the beliefs of the superterrorism school.  If our way of life cannot 
be destroyed, then worrying excessively about CBRN terrorism is a misplacement of 
assets and fears. 
6. Hart-Rudman Commission (1998–2001) 
The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (Hart-Rudman 
Commission) was given three tasks:  "First, to analyze the emerging international security 
environment; Next, to develop a U.S. national security strategy appropriate to that 
environment; Finally to assess the various security institutions for their current relevance 
to the effective and efficient implementation of that strategy, and to recommend 
adjustments as necessary."92  The remainder of this section will search for any focus on 
CBRN terrorism within the commission's findings. 
As a result of their study, the Hart-Rudman Commission found 14 major themes 
and implications for the world through 2025.  First and foremost was, "America will 
become increasingly vulnerable to hostile attack on our homeland, and our military 
superiority will not entirely protect us."93  Within this theme, the commission found that 
"States, terrorists, and other disaffected groups will acquire weapons of mass destruction 
and mass disruption, and some will use them.  Americans will likely die on American 
soil, possibly in large numbers."94  Other obsessive language within the report is the 
declaration that "the United States should assume that it will be a target of terrorist 
attacks against its homeland using weapons of mass destruction.  The United States will 
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be vulnerable to such strikes."95  Listed as the second major theme and implication 
associated with CBRN terrorism is "rapid advances in information and biotechnologies 
will create new vulnerabilities for U.S. security."96  The report finds that bioterrorism is 
the most likely of the CBRN family to be used:  "Biological weapons are the most likely 
choice of means for disaffected states and groups of the 21st century.  They are nearly as 
easy to develop as chemical weapons, they are far more lethal, and they are likely to 
become easier to deliver."97  These findings are significant in advancing the obsession 
theme.   
C. PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP 
President Clinton was fascinated by CBRN weapons through his reading of 
fiction books on the subject.  Some have gone so far as to call Clinton obsessed with 
CBRN proliferation and terrorism.  Claridge finds CBRN terrorism as "...a defining 
obsession of the Clinton administration..."98 He blames this fascination on Clinton's 
reading of the Richard Preston bio-terror novel, The Cobra Event.”99  Clinton confirmed 
this fascination in an interview with the New York Times in 1999 stating, "...I also find 
that reading novels, futuristic novels—sometimes people with an imagination are not 
wrong—Preston's novel about biological warfare..."100 He further calls the Cobra Event 
impressive because of its credible sources.  The novel also had an impact on Congress, 
with author Richard Preston testifying before Congress on April 22, 1998.  During this 
testimony Preston describes how the far reaching impact of his "...fact-based novel The 
Cobra Event, which describes a bioterrorism event in New York City, and which I 
understand President Clinton, Defense Secretary William Cohen, and Speaker Newt 
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Gingrich have all read with interest..."101 The remainder of this section will examine 
Clinton speeches and policy documents in search of obsession. 
Seth Carus conducted a study of presidential use of the word "WMD" from 
Truman to George W. Bush.  His search examined those papers that were available in the 
American Presidency Project.  Only speeches and press conferences were examined and 












Table 6.   Presidential Use of "WMD" in Speeches102 
President Clinton had used the term significantly more than his predecessors.  
Does this equate to obsession, or more likely a president aware of and addressing new 
threats facing his nation?   
WMD rhetoric was transformed into action on November 14, 1994, when 
President Clinton declared a state of emergency regarding WMD proliferation: 
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I, WILLIAM J. CLINTON, President of the United States of America, 
find that the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons 
("weapons of mass destruction") and of the means of delivering such 
weapons, constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national 
security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States, and hereby 
declare a national emergency to deal with that threat.103 
Continuing further down this path, Clinton later issued Presidential Decision 
Directive Number 39 in 1995 stating: 
The United States shall give the highest priority to developing effective 
capabilities to detect, prevent, defeat and manage the consequences of 
nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC) materials or weapons use by 
terrorists. (U) The acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by a 
terrorist group, through theft or manufacture, is unacceptable. There is no 
higher priority than preventing the acquisition of this capability or 
removing this capability from terrorist groups potentially opposed to the 
U.S. (U)104 
Even though the president was deeply concerned with CBRN terrorism, obsession 
is probably not an accurate label for the administration.  In a later speech he stated,  
I have been stressing the importance of this issue, now, for some time.  As 
I have said repeatedly, and I want to say again to you, I am not trying to 
put any American into a panic over this, but I am determined to see that 
we have a serious, deliberate, disciplined, long-term response to a 
legitimate potential threat to the lives and safety of the American 
people.105 
President Clinton had the responsibility to ensure a system was set up to deal with this 
emerging threat.  An increase in spending to ensure adequate defensive measures were in 
place was likely viewed as obsessive by some, as spending goes from zero to a large 
amount.  The next section will examine if rhetoric was put into action in the form of 
national security priorities. 
                                                 
103 William Jefferson Clinton, "Executive Order 12938:  Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction,"  (November 14,1994,), 1. 
104 William Jefferson Clinton, "Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-39:  U.S. Policy on 
Counterterrorism," (June 21, 1995), 9. 
105 William Jefferson Clinton, "Remarks by the President to 17th Annual Legislative Conference of 
the International Association of Fire Fighters,"  (March 15, 1999). 
 49 
1. National Security Strategy Documents 
Proliferation of WMD was an important element of every National Security 
Strategy (NSS) from 1990 to 1994.  As early as 1990, President Bush recognized the 
need to "prevent the transfer of militarily critical technologies and resources to hostile 
countries or groups, especially the spread of weapons of mass destruction and associated 
high-technology means of delivery."106  Beginning with President Clinton in 1994, the 
language began to change to specifically address the threat of terrorism with WMD:  
"Terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction represents a particularly dangerous 
potential threat that must be countered."107  This language was repeated verbatim in the 
1995 and 1996 updates to the NSS.108  In 1997, radical changes to the NSS began 
concerning the language used to describe the threat of CBRN terrorism.   
In 1997, the Clinton Administration called "Weapons of mass destruction the 
greatest potential threat to global security."109  Previously proliferation was a major 
security challenge.  Thus, the change from major security challenge to "greatest potential 
threat to global security," is significant.  Proliferation of CBRN weapons appears to be 
more important than CBRN terrorism.  However, Clinton later goes on to state that 
"danger exists from outlaw states opposed to regional and global security efforts and 
transnational actors, such as terrorists or international crime organizations, potentially 
employing nuclear, chemical or biological weapons against unprotected peoples or 
governments."110  The following year, the possibility of CBRN terrorism is noted as a 
special concern.111  WMD threats to the homeland emerged in the 1998 NSS as a result 
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of Clinton's Presidential Decision Directive 62 that established policy and responsibilities 
for CBRN terrorist attacks on U.S. soil.112  Prior to 1998, CBRN terrorism threats to the 
U.S. were not addressed.  Little changed in the 1999 NSS, but a new buzzword 
emerged—the nexus between terrorism and proliferation.113  Evolution within the 
multitude of NSS' during the 1990s was shown above, but what does this mean relative to 
obsession with CBRN terrorism? 
National Security Strategies provide general strategic guidance to government 
agencies and the general public.  If the administrations were obsessed with CBRN 
terrorism, it would have gotten higher priority within these documents.  In the final NSS 
before 9/11, the 1999 NSS identified the following list of threats in order:  Regional or 
state-centered threats, transnational threats (includes terrorism), spread of dangerous 
technologies, failed states, foreign intelligence collection, and environmental health 
threats.114  Had policymakers been obsessed with CBRN terrorism, the threat would have 
been placed higher than the traditional conflicts of the century in terms of threats to U.S. 
interests. 
D. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
Every year the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) provides a report to the President 
and Congress on Department of Defense (DoD) capabilities.  This report includes 
strategic guidance from the SECDEF reiterating the President's National Security 
Strategy and includes a list of U.S. vital interests.  The table below summarizes the 
priorities listed by these documents from the 1990s. 115 
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While the individual issues of terrorism and counterproliferation appear within the 
priorities of the DoD, CBRN terrorism does not appear in the top concerns.  That is not 
today that they were not concerned, when Secretary of Defense William Cohen took over 
from William Perry, he noted that "in particular, the nexus of such lethal knowledge and 
the emergence of terrorist movements dedicated to massive casualties represents a new 
paradigm for national security."116  CBRN terrorism was just one of many national 
security concerns of the DoD, but their actions relevant to the threats did not constitute 
obsessive behavior. 
E. CONGRESS 
The 1980s were filled with a string of terrorist attacks on U.S. interests with the 
most significant attacks occurring in the 1983 Beirut bombings of the U.S. Embassy and 
Marine barracks.  Following the attacks, two commissions were formed to investigate.  
Admiral Long chaired one of these commissions within the DOD, recommending a more 
proactive approach to counterterrorism.117  The other commission chaired by former CIA 
director Inman recommended improvements to security of State Department facilities 
abroad.  Congress was affected by these reports, reinvigorating "two existing but largely 
quiescent interagency bodies, the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism and 
the Interagency Group on Terrorism."118  This renewed interest on terrorism led to the 
Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) being tasked to "study the state 
of research and development into technologies that could be of use in countering 
terrorism."119  The remainder of this section will review those OTA reports in search of 
obsession with CBRN terrorism. 
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1. Congressional Office of Technology Assessments 
The first study by the OTA examined technology related to counterterrorism, 
specifically focused on explosives detection for airline security.  Also studied, was the 
level of coordination between the many federal agencies within the counterterror field.  
Findings from the study were released in the spring of 1991.  Two of the five findings 
were concerned with the lack of budgeting for research and development of emerging 
explosives detection devices.  The other three findings were concerned with current 
explosives screening devices.  Interestingly, the fifth recommendation advocated more 
than just a technological approach, but enhanced "passenger screening, could play a 
strong role in improving security in commercial air travel."120  Concerns over terrorists 
employing chemical or biological weapons also emerged in the first OTA study. 
OTA researchers noted, "While little, if any terrorist activity has yet been 
manifest in the chemical or biological arenas, most observers agree that the technical 
capability for designing weapons based on these agents is not beyond the abilities of a 
large number of currently active terrorist organizations."121  On nuclear terrorism, the 
report believes the probability of a nuclear terrorism incident is low.122  They find the 
odds of a chemical or biological attack by terrorists "are perhaps even or slightly 
higher."123  Fears of CBRN terrorism were fueled by comments from Iranian President 
Rafsanjani where he urged "Islamic Fighters" to fully equip themselves "both in the 
offensive and defensive use of chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons."124  
A known state sponsor of terrorism, who had been involved in terrorist acts against the 
U.S., in possession of a CBRN program constituted a real threat to U.S. national security.  
This led the OTA to the conclude, "There is a very real possibility of attacks using 
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chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction in the near future."125  However, this 
is only one of nine conclusions the study reaches on the future of terrorism.  Once again, 
CBRN terrorism was a concern, but only one of many. 
A subsequent report issued in 1992, followed up on the 1991 report and focused 
on four areas not covered by the previous report including:  bio-terror threat, cooperation 
in counterterrorism research and development, aviation security, and a human factors 
approach to aviation security.126 A section devoted to "Terrorism and Biological 
Weapons" found that "U.S. targets are vulnerable to a biological attack."127  
Recommendations were made to develop detection equipment and vaccines for known 
biological agents.  Overall, the report issued ten findings: one dealing with the chemical 
and biological terrorism threat, one concerning interagency communication and 
coordination, two dealt with aviation security, and six with an integrated human factors 
approach to security.128  Of these ten findings, eight were focused on aviation security as 
the threat flavor of the day because of the aircraft bombing entering the mainstream 
terrorist arsenal during the late 1980s.  Thus, this report was more concerned with 
aviation security than CBRN terrorism.   
Another OTA report entitled, Proliferation of WMD:  Assessing the Risk was 
issued in 1993.  The purpose of this report was "to assist Congress in its efforts to 
strengthen and broaden U.S. policies to control the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction."129  CBRN terrorism is not addressed in the report, but it does focus on an 
issue central to CBRN terrorism, proliferation.130  More CBRN weapons on the market 
increases the risk that terrorist groups could acquire them.  No CBRN terrorism focus is 
evident in this final OTA report on issues linked to CBRN terrorism. 
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F. STATE DEPARTMENT 
The State Department publishes an annual assessment of terrorist groups and state 
sponsors.  According to the State Department website, "U.S. law requires the Secretary of 
State to provide Congress, by April 30 of each year, a full and complete report on 
terrorism with regard to those countries and groups meeting criteria set forth in the 
legislation."131  In 1999, the report started to include a special inset devoted to WMD 
terrorism, listed behind the state sponsors of terrorism (prior to 1999, this insert did not 
exist).  This first report notes the increased possibility of WMD terrorism, but states most 
terrorists will focus on conventional weapons with some attempting to acquire CBRN 
weapons.132  Following in the 1999 reports footsteps, the 2000 report contained a WMD 
insert that noted the threat "remained real," and that bin Laden sought CBRN 
capabilities.133  The 2001 Report was submitted after 9/11 and continued to report on 
WMD terrorism under the new label of CBRN terrorism.  CBRN terrorism concerns were 
elevated following 9/11 with the State Department report noting, "In the wake of these 
unprecedented attacks, terrorists increasingly may look to use chemical, biological, 
radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) materials—many of which can cause significant 
casualties—to rival the events of September 11."134   
G. CONCLUSION 
In the 1999 Council on Foreign Relations study, Editor John Reilly noted, "In a 
democracy we expect policy to be generally congruent with public opinion."135  A review 
of public opinion prior to 9/11 shows a public deeply concerned with CBRN terrorism 
and terrorism in general.  Obsession is a difficult threshold to cross, where rhetoric must 
meet with reality.  Commissions in search of direction for national security and 
counterterrorism policy found terrorism and proliferation to be significant threats to the 
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U.S., but they were not obsessed with CBRN terrorism. They found a hole in our policy 
and defense regarding CBRN weapons and terrorism.  In response policymakers shifted 
assets to forge a previously non-existent capability.   
If obsession with CBRN terrorism did not exist prior to 9/11, perhaps 9/11 was a 
catalyst for such an obsession.  In the wake of the attack, national security documents 
began to emerge that were previously nonexistent, such as the National Strategy to 
Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction.  This document noted, "Weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD)—nuclear, biological, and chemical—in the possession of hostile 
states and terrorists represent one of the greatest security challenges facing the United 
States."136  This will be discussed in further detail in the final chapter. 
 
                                                 






V. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES  
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, intelligence agencies faced a barrage of 
criticism for failing to prevent the attack.  The 9/11 Commission found three intelligence 
failures within the overall imagination failure.  First, was a failure to understand the 
nature and severity of the terrorist threat.  Next, they discovered "...fault lines within our 
government--between foreign and domestic intelligence, and between and within our 
agencies..."137 Finally, they found a failure to share information between the various 
intelligence agencies.  The failure of not understanding the threat has been widely 
debated and will most likely never be agreed upon.  Failures attributed to barriers and 
information sharing are not new failures, numerous commissions and studies have 
highlighted them during the 1990s.  The 9/11 Commission found much of the 
imagination failure related to the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) process, which 
they found to have been inadequately updated prior to 9/11.  They view this product as 
the vehicle that might have highlighted an increased threat, and thus increased prevention 
measures potentially foiling the attack.  Another main focus of the 9/11 Commission 
Report was the failure to analyze how aircraft might be used as a weapon.  What is 
missing from most analysis is an understanding of what intelligence agencies were 
focused on prior to the attacks.  Were they preoccupied by CBRN terrorism?  As 
discussed in the literature review, the 9/11 Commission made a vague indication that this 
might have been the case, but did not provide any support to this claim. 
This chapter will start with an examination of intelligence reform prior to 9/11, in 
an attempt to analyze whether the intelligence community (IC) was too focused on 
CBRN terrorism.  The second portion of this chapter will examine the annual threat 
hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.  IC leadership presents their 
views of likely threats to national security in this annual testimony.  One finding of this  
                                                 





research is that the concern with CBRN terrorism was growing in the community prior to 
9/11, but they were not obsessed.  In fact, they had too many issues and not enough assets 
to be obsessed with any one area.   
A. INTELLIGENCE COMMISSIONS 
The previous chapter analyzed commissions during the 1990s that recommended 
changes to national security policy.  Amy Zegart studied 12 commissions dealing with 
intelligence, law enforcement, and counterterrorism reform.  Commissions with an 
intelligence focus will be examined in this section to determine whether the IC was 
obsessed with CBRN terrorism, as the 9/11 Commission obscurely hints at. 
1. Aspin-Brown Commission 
As a result of the fall of Communism and the Ames espionage case, Congress 
chartered the commission in October of 1994 to review the IC.138  The collapse of the 
Soviet Union caused many to ask the question, do we still need intelligence.  
Commissioners were tasked with answering this question, and with how to improve the 
system's efficiency and effectiveness.139  Did the Aspin-Brown Commission focus the IC 
on CBRN terrorism? 
A total of 39 recommendations (38 intelligence and one non-intelligence) were 
made by the Aspin-Brown Commission.  Only one recommendation was related to 
CBRN terrorism: 
The Commission recommends that the President by Executive Order 
reaffirm that global criminal activities such as terrorism, narcotics 
trafficking, organized crime, and proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction are national security matters and require a coordinated, multi-
agency response. A law enforcement approach alone is inadequate.140   
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Key issues related to CBRN terrorism, terrorism and proliferation were linked to national 
security matters.  As these issues emerged, they faced competition from a wide variety of 
other national security issues.  CBRN terrorism is but one area of focus for the IC, not the 
most important.  Aspin-Brown and the other commissions were focused on many issues, 
as shown by the total number of recommendations, and the remainder of these 
commissions will be more narrowly examined for where CBRN terrorism fits within the 
priorities for intelligence collection. 
2. Council on Foreign Relations 
This independent commission notes up front, "The end of the Cold War has not 
ushered in an age of peace and security."141  As a result, they look to prioritize U.S. 
intelligence collection in the following order: "status of nuclear weapons and materials in 
the former Soviet Union"; Iraq, Iran and North Korea; terrorism against the U.S.; 
unconventional weapons proliferation; and China.142  Proliferation and terrorism make up 
a majority of the priorities outlined by the commission, especially considering the 
"rogue" status given to Iraq, Iran, and North Korea.  It is significant that a major focus is 
given to issues related to CBRN terrorism, but proliferation seems to be given the most 
focus. 
3. IC21:  The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century 
Unlike the Council on Foreign Relations study, IC21 found the post-Cold War 
environment less threatening:  "U.S. national security interests are less threatened than at 
any time since 1940."143  Thus, the committee found it critical to review national 
security priorities during this period of relative calm.  IC21's goal was to "define the type 
of intelligence community that will best meet U.S. national security needs into the next 
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century."144  Zegart counted 75 findings within the IC21 report; most of them are 
inapplicable to this thesis.  Of interest is Section III, which deals with the intelligence 
requirements process.  IC21 found that the IC had adapted to meet the challenges in the 
post-Cold War environment, but warned of problems within the current process for 
identifying and prioritizing intelligence needs.  This "needs process" is derived from 
multiple sources including PDD-35 and Strategic Intelligence Reviews and will be 
discussed in further detail below.   
4. National Performance Review 
President Clinton directed a sweeping review of the U.S. government in 1993.  In 
his announcement of the program he stated, "Our goal is to make the entire federal 
government both less expensive and more efficient, and to change the culture of our 
national bureaucracy away from complacency and entitlement toward initiative and 
empowerment.  We intend to redesign, to reinvent, to reinvigorate the entire national 
government."145  As part of this government wide review, the IC was examined and 
recommendations were made on issues such as organization, integration, and customer 
service.  The only applicable work to this thesis is an ironic premonition.  It notes that a 
diminishing IC "can no longer afford to prepare for worst-case scenarios.  Risk 
management, rather than worst-case scenarios, must drive the setting of priorities and 
allocation of resources."146 No evidence of obsession exists in this report, but it warns 
against such behavior that many accused the Clinton administration of exhibiting. 
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5. National Institute for Public Policy 
This 1997 report was an independent review of the IC and notes up front that "it is 
not concerned with whether more intelligence attention should be put on the Third World, 
terrorism, nuclear proliferation, Russia, or economic affairs."  Thus, it is inapplicable to 
this thesis. 
6. Twentieth Century Fund Task Force 
The Twentieth Century Fund is a "not-for-profit and nonpartisan" organization 
that was founded in 1919 to sponsor and supervise timely analysis of "economic policy, 
foreign affairs, and domestic political issues."147  One purpose of this study was to 
answer the question, "How has the mission changed?"148  Task force members found that 
military needs were dominating the IC and they recommended balance between military 
and civilian intelligence needs.  They found that an increased focus on economic 
intelligence was needed.  Proliferation and terrorism are mentioned as a reflection of the 
President's National Security Strategy, but there is no focus on either topic in the 
commission's findings. 
B. NEEDS AND PRIORITIES 
President Clinton, as a means to prioritize intelligence collection, issued 
presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 35. While the PDD is still classified, former 
National Security Advisor Anthony Lake described the process.  He stated that PDD-35 
"formally established our top intelligence priorities and placed terrorism among them, led 
only by intelligence support for our troops in the field and a small number of states that 
posed an immediate or potential threat to the United States."149  The 9/11 Joint Inquiry by 
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the House and Senate criticized the PDD-35 process because it "was never effectively 
adapted before September 11 to meet the changing nature of the threat, despite specific 
language in the document that required an annual review."150  As certain priorities began 
to rise, lesser priorities were never downgraded and resources were inadequate to cover 
all of the taskings.  Faced with an overwhelming number of taskings it would be difficult 
to argue that the IC was obsessed with any area of interest.  Or, as the Joint Inquiry 
identified, everything was a priority and the IC was obsessed with everything, because 
the intelligence consumer "wanted to know everything about everything all the time."151  
One way of establishing priorities was through the use of Strategic Intelligence Reviews 
(SIRs). 
1. Strategic Intelligence Reviews 
The National Intelligence Council (NIC) first published SIRs in May of 1994.  
These documents examined near term intelligence needs (12–18 months) including 
"issues, priorities, and gaps for various geographic regions and transnational issues" in an 
effort to efficiently allocate collection resources.152  SIRs also identified enduring needs 
(3–7 years), for budget allocation.  Most of these documents are classified, but the 
declassified 1998 SIR on International Organized Crime gives some insight on the 20 
areas of interest to the IC.  Topics for 1998 SIRs included:  arms control; 
counterintelligence; counternarcotics, counterterrorism; denial and deception; economics, 
environmental, multilateral, and humanitarian interests; force modernization; 
international organized crime; nonproliferation; science and technology, strategic military 
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forces, support to diplomatic operations, support to military operations; East Asia; 
Europe; Latin America; Near East and South Asia; Russia and Eurasia; Sub-Saharan 
Africa.153   
Of these 20 topics, only counterterrorism and nonproliferation are easily 
identifiable as related to CBRN terrorism.  The SIR on International Organized Crime 
identifies smuggling of nuclear materials or WMD as a threat to U.S. interests.  Without 
access to the other SIRs, it is impossible to determine how much attention was paid to 
CBRN terrorism issues.  The wide variety of SIRs shows how many different directions 
the IC was going in, and points further away from obsession. 
2. Annual Threat Assessments 
Every year the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) conducts a review 
with the IC in order to review and prioritize national security threats.  Testifying annually 
before the committee are the CIA Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Director, 
and a representative from the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research 
(INR). The importance of this meeting is highlighted in the opening statement of the 
SSCI vice chairman Senator Kerrey, "This annual public review of the threats is probably 
our most important hearing.  It sets the context for the resource decisions we will make in 
the intelligence budget.  But even more important, it informs the public that there are still 
threats to the Nation..."154 Threats and their relative priorities are important element of 
where the IC was focused prior to 9/11.  This section will analyze the threat assessments 
provided to the SSCI in the years leading up to 9/11, in an effort to see if an obsession 
with CBRN terrorism existed within the IC.  These threats evolved over the course of 
available data from 1996–2001.  They show an intelligence community concerned with 
proliferation and terrorism, as well as a variety of other threats, and thus unable to be 
obsessed with anything. 
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In his 1996 testimony to Congress on current and projected threats to 
national security, CIA Director John Deutch identified a multitude of threats.  They 
included:  great power metamorphosis in Russia and China; rogue nations (Iran, Iraq, 
North Korea, Libya); transnational issues (drugs, terrorism, crime, WMD); economic 
interdependence; and humanitarian crisis and ethnic turmoil.155  A clear prioritization of 
these issues is not given by the director, but concerning transnational issues he states: "Of 
the transnational issues, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and advanced 
conventional weapons systems pose the gravest threat to national security and world 
stability."156 The tone of the hearing still considers regional powers and rogue states as 
the greatest security threat to the U.S.  However, Deutch also notes that the potential for 
CBRN terrorism will increase over time as dual-use technology spreads.157 
At the conclusion of the 1996 hearing, the IC was charged with answering 
46 questions by the SSCI.  Of these 46 questions, only two dealt with CBRN terrorism 
("The foreign terror threat to the United States" and "Threat of terrorist biological, 
chemical, or radiological weapon").  The issues of concern for the Senate committee were 
wide-ranging and thus point away from obsession.  Proliferation and traditional threats 
received more focus than CBRN terrorism. 
2. 1997 
Tenet identifies five critical challenges for the next century in his 1997 
testimony before the SSCI:  transformation within Russia and China, rogue states, 
transnational issues (proliferation and terrorism), regional hotspots, and humanitarian 
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crisis.158  Despite the leadership change at the top within the CIA, with an appearance as 
the number three threat, it is hard to argue that the IC was more concerned with terrorism 
or proliferation.  It is interesting to note that the CIA rated the WMD terrorism threat as 
"low but increasing."159  DIA Director General Hughes also calls the threat negligible:  
"While advanced and exotic weapons are increasingly available, their employment is 
likely to remain minimal."160 
3. 1998 
Priorities began to change in 1998.  Tenet listed five challenges to the 
U.S.: transnational issues; Russian and Chinese transformation; regional troublemakers; 
regional hotspots; and humanitarian challenges.161  Within transnational issues, 
proliferation is the greatest threat.  This is followed by economic instability in Asia and 
terrorism.  On proliferation, Tenet states "when proliferation links up with terrorism, we 
could face a high-order threat."162  It is important to note that transnational issues have 
started to replace traditional threats as the most dangerous national security threat.  
During the question and answer portion of the hearing, Director Tenet specifically 
addresses the potential of chemical or biological attacks on U.S. soil.  The SSCI 
specifically asks the IC the following question: 
What is the likelihood that the US will be subjected to a biological or 
chemical attack within the next 2–5 years? 5–10 years? How is this attack 
likely to be carried out? Do you consider a BW/CW attack against the US 
as more likely than a ballistic missile attack against the US? How difficult 
is it for a group to construct and deliver an effective chemical weapon? A 
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biological or radiological weapon? A nuclear device? What existing 
groups now have or are seeking such a capability?163 
In response, the CIA concludes that terrorist groups are increasingly interested in CBRN 
weapons.  They estimated the conventional and unconventional international terrorist 
threat as significant, but stated "terrorists probably will continue to favor conventional 
tactics."164  Finally, they judged "that the potential for terrorists to use or attempt to use 
WMD or chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) materials is 
increasing."165  Not all of the questions were answered in this open session, and were 
perhaps answered in the classified closed-door session.  In analyzing these CIA estimates, 
it is hard to arrive at obsession when they assessed that terrorists would stick to their 
favorite weapons, the gun and bomb.  The FBI arrived at a slightly more alarming 
conclusion. 
The FBI assessed that "it is very likely that there will be continued 
instances of WMD use in the United States in the next 2–5 years..."166 They noted a 
disturbing trend of an increased interest in CBRN materials, specifically biological 
agents.  In their final analysis, the FBI notes the difficulty in assigning a probability to the 
likelihood of an attack in five to ten years, but concludes the "prospect of such an 
incident occurring in the U.S. as we reach the millennium in the United States is 
increasing."167  However, just like the CIA, they "still believe that conventional terrorist 
weapons and methods, i.e., bombings, use of firearms and kidnappings are still the 
primary methods of operations by terrorists."168  From this conflicting analysis,  
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it is difficult to assign obsession to the FBI.  Their alarmist attitudes might have been a 
function of the large number of chemical terrorism hoaxes they were investigating during 
this time period. 
4. 1999 
Director Tenet outlined similar priorities to the previous year:  WMD 
proliferation; terrorism; narcotics and organized crime; information warfare and the Year 
2000 bug; Russia and China; and regional troublemakers.  On terrorism, Tenet spoke of 
two specific concerns, Bin Laden and the acquisition of CBRN weapons by terrorist 
groups.169 
5. 2000 
Tenet's threat picture remained the same from 1999.  He updated his 
concern over WMD proliferation, noting "the picture I drew last year has become even 
more stark and worrisome."170  Bin Laden was now addressed as the greatest terror 
threat, and Tenet was concerned over Bin Laden's strong interest in chemical weapons.  
Tenet acknowledges that of the more than 24 renditions of terrorists during 1999 that they 
still rely only on conventional weapons.171 
6. 2001 
In the final update prior to 9/11, CIA Director George Tenet testifies to the 
difficulties facing the intelligence community of having too many things on their plate 
and having to prioritize them.  As a result he states, "For me, the highest priority must 
invariably be on those things that threaten the lives of Americans or the physical security 
of the United States.   With that in mind, let me turn first to the challenges posed by 
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international terrorism."172  Terrorism had become the number one concern of the CIA.  
During the question and answer section of the hearing, Tenet is specifically asked by 
Senator Roberts if terrorism and homeland security should be the number one national 
security priority, and he answered yes.173   
DIA Director Admiral Wilson testified to his views on threats to U.S. 
interests.  In his view, the greatest near-term threat to U.S. interests was "a major terrorist 
attack against United States interests, either here or abroad, perhaps with a weapon 
designed to produce mass casualties."174  He also warned of widespread chemical and 
biological weapons proliferation, and predicted they might be used in a terrorist attack 
within the next 15 years.175 
C. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES 
The National Security Act of 1947 (as recently amended) Section 103B directs the 
production of “national intelligence estimates for the United States Government, 
including alternative views held by elements of the intelligence community….”  National 
Intelligence Estimates (NIE) are a regular intelligence product tailored for policy makers 
that provide “analyses of diverse aspects of the world situation, which include the policy 
objectives and likely actions of other nations, and their military capabilities/potential.”176  
NIEs are a vehicle for assisting leaders who create national security policy, and they are 
referred to by many as the “Intelligence Community’s most authoritative written 
judgment.”177  These estimates incorporate the current situation on a topic and include 
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judgments about the future course of events.  Were there any NIEs related to CBRN 
terrorism prior to 9/11 that might have shown an obsession with CBRN terrorism? 
As mentioned at the beginning of this thesis, the scope is limited to unclassified 
documents.  Most NIEs are classified, but some are beginning to be declassified.  In 1986 
an NIE on "The Likelihood of Nuclear Acts by Terrorist Groups" was published.  The 
authors of this NIE judged that the possibility of high-level nuclear terrorism was low to 
very low.178  They believed in a "…a somewhat greater possibility that terrorists will 
engage in those lower level types of nuclear terrorism that are designed mainly to garner 
publicity or to undermine a government's nuclear or other policies."179  Specifically they 
rated the probability of such terrorism as less than even, a number that was predicted in 
the previous NIE.  Without access to subsequent updates to this NIE, it is impossible to 
assess whether this document might add or detract from an obsession within the IC 
concerning CBRN terrorism, but clearly the subject was of concern. 
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter examined the intelligence community in search of obsession with 
CBRN terrorism.  A central theme in the examination of both intelligence review 
committees and the threats to national security presented annually by the CIA director 
was the post-Cold War struggle to identify and prioritize national security threats, and 
thus intelligence collection priorities.  CBRN terrorism was found to be just one of the 
many issues.  Proliferation and terrorism were both major transnational threats, but they 
still failed to become elevated above traditional major or regional conflict threats.   
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These priorities evolved over the course of the 1990s, but they never managed to capture 
the number one priority of intelligence agencies.  Although an acknowledged important 
issue that grew, intelligence agencies were not obsessed with CBRN terrorism.180 
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A. THESIS ORIGIN 
The origin for this thesis began with an interest in The 9/11Commission Report.  
Of particular interest was the imagination failure claim that: 
The head of analysis at the CTC until 1999 discounted the alarms about a 
catastrophic threat as relating only to the danger of chemical, biological, 
or nuclear attack—and he downplayed even that, writing several months 
before  9/11:  "It would be a mistake to redefine counterterrorism as a task 
of dealing with 'catastrophic,' 'grand,' or 'super' terrorism, when in fact 
these labels do not represent most of the terrorism that the United States is 
likely to face or most of the costs that terrorism imposes on U.S. 
interests."181 
Bruce Hoffman's questioning by the Congressional inquiry furthered the notion that the 
government might have been obsessed with CBRN terrorism.  Obsession was further 
fueled by Andrew Silke's claim that, “If the failure to mark out the importance of al-
Qa’eda was the biggest oversight in research prior to 9/11, the obsession with work on 
WMD threats—as opposed to more mundane tactics—will likely be judged as the second 
most significant failing."182 Intrigued by these comments, a search began to examine 
whether the U.S. might have been obsessed with CBRN terrorism, and potentially 
blinded to the more commonplace terrorist techniques such as hijacking and suicide 
attacks.   
 While the academic, policymaking, and intelligence communities were concerned 
with CBRN terrorism, they were not obsessed.  Obsessive rhetoric certainly existed 
concerning CBRN terrorism.  However, actions that would have been considered 
obsessive, such as focusing research, policy, and intelligence assets, was not found.  
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B. ORIGINS REVISITED 
The Gilmore Commission concluded that the Aum attack set a precedent for mass 
destruction.183  Many believed the Aum attack had broken the taboo on the use of CBRN 
weapons by terrorists groups.  Terrorism expert Brian Jenkins stated, "It breaks a taboo 
and has psychological import. Others will ask whether they should adopt such tactics. It 
is now more likely that at least some of them will say ‘yes’.”184  If the taboo has been 
broken, then why have we not been attacked again with CBRN terrorism?  Perhaps the 
pessimistic capabilities proposition outlined by Sprinzak, where any terrorist can build a 
CBRN weapon in his garage, has been invalidated.  Maybe there is an alternative lesson 
from the Aum attack. 
At first glance, the Aum attack seemed to validate the construction portion of the 
capabilities proposition.  A terrorist group was able to successfully manufacture Sarin gas 
and deploy it.  The belief that this alone validates the pessimist point of view is ignorant 
of several flaws with the Aum attack.  First, the group was unable to obtain the maximum 
level of lethality for the weapon.  A pre-9/11 study showed that, "While it is theoretically 
true that a quart of nerve agent contains about a million lethal doses, the oft-discussed 
basement terrorist would labor roughly two years to make enough sarin to kill five 
hundred outdoors and another eighteen years to produce the ton of sarin required to kill 
ten thousand."185  Also, the attack was rushed into employment because Aum received 
warning of an imminent police raid; this prevented the gas from reaching its lethal 
potential.  Twelve deaths do not equal mass destruction.   
Second, the employment method was crude, with the cult members punching 
holes in the bags of Sarin gas with umbrellas.   Previous attempts by more technical 
means were unsuccessful, another point discrediting the capabilities proposition.  As 
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discussed with biological weapons above, developing weapons is only one step of the 
process, employing them can be more difficult.  All of the Aum attacks and subsequent 
ineffective anthrax attacks within the U.S. provide evidence to discount the production 
aspect of the capabilities proposition.   
B. ACADEMIA 
Academia plays a significant role in policy advice, as well as open-source or all-
source intelligence.  The fact that Congress questioned terrorism experts such as Bruce 
Hoffman and others, points to the value of their opinions and research.  It is interesting 
that some thought that a Library of Congress study discussing suicide terrorism with 
airplanes is cited by a Senator as open-source intelligence, but this highlights a problem 
that is shown elsewhere in this thesis, that there is more information than can possibly be 
consumed and analyzed by intelligence and policymakers alike.  The link between open-
source intelligence and academia is important when one considers that if an intelligence 
failure existed, then it is likely that an academic one existed as well. 
Silke claimed, “Prior to 9/11, nearly six times more research was being conducted 
on CBRN terrorist tactics than on suicide tactics.  Indeed no other terrorist tactic (from 
car-bombings, hijackings, assassinations, etc.) received anywhere near as much research 
attention in the run up to 9/11 as CBRN.”186  This thesis showed that Silke's analysis was 
narrowly focused on the two primary terrorism journals, and should have incorporated 
the broader field of literature to include other journals and other published works.  When 
this field was widened, it showed an academic community increasingly concerned with 
CBRN terrorism prior to 9/11, but not obsessed. 
C. POLICY 
Analysis of the policymaking community started with a search for obsession 
within the national security reform committees in the 1990s.  Within these committees, 
this research looked to see what politicians viewed as the greatest threats to national 
                                                 





security, and to see where CBRN terrorism was in that hierarchy.  Both the Deutch and 
Gilmore Commissions looked specifically at CBRN terrorism issues, proliferation and 
CBRN terrorism itself.  Because they both had a narrow focus on these issues, they were 
inherently obsessive.  Despite this focus, the Gilmore Commission urged balance 
between catastrophic threats and conventional terrorist tactics.  Of the five commissions, 
the Hart-Rudman Commission contained the most obsessive WMD terrorism rhetoric, 
concluding that terrorists will acquire and use WMD and that the government should 
assume they would target the U.S.  
In an attempt to see if CBRN terrorism rhetoric met an obsessive policy reaction 
this thesis also examined the chief national security strategy documents, the NSS.  This 
examination showed a nation still concerned more with Cold War style threats.  
However, this threat evolved towards the new century to one more concerned with 
transnational issues, such as terrorism and proliferation, but they never replaced the top 
threats of regional conflict or state-centered threats.  This way of thinking was also not 
surprisingly translated to the DoD in their list of security priorities. 
Obsession is probably too strong a word for describing the concerns of 
policymakers.  Those who would do so ignore the responsibility of such policymakers to 
provide security to the citizenry.  In the same interview where Clinton discusses his 
fascination with The Cobra Event, Clinton discusses this responsibility.  He states, "But 
to me, it is money well spent.  And if there is never an incident, nobody would be happier 
than me 20 years from now if the same critics would be able to say, 'Oh, see, Clinton was 
a kook, nothing happened,' I would be the happiest man on earth."187   
D. INTELLIGENCE 
Intelligence agencies were not obsessed with CBRN terrorism.  They were 
concerned with proliferation and terrorism, but these transnational issues never 
dominated national security interests.  Similar to the conclusions reached in the policy 
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chapter, and perhaps because politicians task them, intelligence agencies never managed 
to escape post-Cold War mentalities.  The greatest threats were still regional conflict and 
Russia and China.  Research in the intelligence area was limited by the availability of 
information due to the preponderance of classified publications within this field.  Only 
one NIE was available, but the information was dated from 1986.  9/11 and the 
legislation resulting from the 9/11 Commission report did result in the creation of an 
additional mandated NIE, “Annual Report on Threat of Attack on the United States Using 
Weapons of Mass Destruction.”188  If this report did not exist before, is it possible that 
9/11 was a catalyst for obsession?  The last section briefly explores this possibility. 
E. 9/11 AS A CATALYST FOR OBSESSION 
Although this thesis did not find an obsession with CBRN terrorism prior to 9/11, 
it did show a trend moving in that direction.  9/11 was a catalyst that triggered further 
concern and possibly obsession with CBRN terrorism by all three communities.  One 
finding of the 9/11 Commission was, "The greatest danger of another catastrophic attack 
in the United States will materialize if the world's most dangerous terrorists acquire the 
world's most dangerous weapons."189  Congress followed up the 9/11 Commission's 
recommendations with the, "Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission 
Act of 2007."  This act created the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation 
and reduced barriers to funding any initiative related to threat reduction or 
nonproliferation programs.190  The Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation 
reached the obsessive conclusion that "…unless the world community acts decisively and 
with great urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be 
                                                 
188 Section 114 [50 U.S.C. 404i] Additional Annual Reports from the Director of National 
Intelligence, National Security Act of 1947, As Amended Through Public Law 110-53, August 3, 2007. 
189 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 380. 
190 Cong., 110th Congress, Implementing Recommendations by the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, 





used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013."191  In a recent 
progress report assessing the government's performance in addressing the problems 
identified by the Commission, it was cited that the Director of National Intelligence, 
Mike McConnell had publicly endorsed this grave assessment.192  An assumption that 
such a catastrophic WMD terrorist attack is inevitable is obsessive.  Are the comments by 
the Congressional commission and DNI evidence that both the policymaking and 
intelligence communities are currently obsessed with CBRN terrorism?  This is a 
potential area of further research.   
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